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Re:Abusing GDB Features for Data Ingress and Egress by not2b on Monday October 23, 2023 @03:29PM (#37990407)
The security issues are already clearly warned about: the debug info must come from a trustworthy server. But I don't see why a black hat would choose this attack vector. They would have to wait for a developer to debug a binary with shared libraries, while fetching debug info from a a corrupted server. The developer would most likely be using a server provided by a distro (say, Red Hat/Fedora), and if a bad guy can replace the debuginfo files on such a server, they can just as easily replace RPMs directly and feed users malware.
Re:Abusing GDB Features for Data Ingress and Egress by tovej on Monday October 23, 2023 @04:12PM (#37990916)
Yes, it would me more notable if a client could somehow compromise the server, which may work theoretically as an internal attack vector in a software dev organization.

I agree that compromising a distro server is unlikely, but I suppose a mitm attack could be plausible though, and this would give arbitrary code execution.

EDIT: or is it ACE? The article seems to emphasize sending arbitrary _data_ to the client, so now I'm confused. If you can make the binary print something else, surely you have ACE? Or do you have to step through the code?

Re:Abusing GDB Features for Data Ingress and Egress by jmprspret on Monday October 23, 2023 @11:46PM (#37994680)
I kind of agree. But another aide to it is that it would be cool to see in a CTF type challenge.