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Re:Encrypted traffic interception on Hetzner and Linode targ... by codedokode on Friday October 20, 2023 @07:01PM (#37962446)
The main problem is that Let's Encrypt issued fake certificates without strict checking. This means any country can start using this method to generate valid certificates for any site within the country. And if the country can pull BGP attack with traffic redirection then for any website.

Let's Encrypt security is a joke.

UPD: It looks like many other CAs also can be tricked to issue valid certificates to any attacker capable of doing MitM, so in general SSL infrastructure security is a joke which is proven by this incident.

Re:Encrypted traffic interception on Hetzner and Linode targ... by lxgr on Friday October 20, 2023 @07:40PM (#37962704)
How would you implement “strict checking” at scale and for free?
Re:Encrypted traffic interception on Hetzner and Linode targ... by codedokode on Friday October 20, 2023 @07:56PM (#37962794)
If they used DNS validation it would be better because there would be only one point of failure (DNS) rather than many (DNS and every ISP between CA and a site).
Re:Encrypted traffic interception on Hetzner and Linode targ... by Jenda_ on Friday October 20, 2023 @09:07PM (#37963202)
The thread above (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37958831) elaborates on how to force DNS validation and/or how to tie your private key with Let's Encrypt via DNS.
Re:Encrypted traffic interception on Hetzner and Linode targ... by codedokode on Saturday October 21, 2023 @01:14PM (#37968659)
Everyone needs to opt-in to use more secure methods and by default non-secure validation methods, which allow easy issuing fake certificates, are allowed. This is wrong.
Re:Encrypted traffic interception on Hetzner and Linode targ... by Jenda_ on Saturday October 21, 2023 @01:38PM (#37968917)
So, what should they do? No certificate without DNS record? Would this really help the overall state of affairs, or would most sites just not use HTTPS at all because it's "too complicated"?
Re:Encrypted traffic interception on Hetzner and Linode targ... by codedokode on Saturday October 21, 2023 @02:07PM (#37969163)
The purpose of using HTTPS is to make connections more secure. Giving away SSL certificates to anyone does not serve this purpose.
Re:Encrypted traffic interception on Hetzner and Linode targ... by lxgr on Saturday October 21, 2023 @02:43PM (#37969436)
It absolutely serves this purpose in a world in which there unfortunately is no TOFU/unauthenticated encryption for TLS (i.e. ours).

Thanks to widely available HTTPS certificates, "evil hackers stealing your cookies on public Wi-Fi" is not a thing anymore.

We should definitely have a discussion about whether it's made active attacks more feasible, but I think the goal of making passive sniffing less trivial than it was before can be considered achieved.

Re:Encrypted traffic interception on Hetzner and Linode targ... by lxgr on Friday October 20, 2023 @09:28PM (#37963293)
And DNS does not traverse several ISPs?
Re:Encrypted traffic interception on Hetzner and Linode targ... by kakwa_ on Saturday October 21, 2023 @09:21AM (#37966610)
Implement a proper Proof of Possession system (PoP) and make Let's Encrypt opt-in instead of opt-out.

Given that in the end, Let's Encrypt/ACME relies on PoP of a DNS domain, DNSSEC setup on the domain should have been a prerequisite.

In addition, an explicit opt-in should be required, for example, with a requirement for a CAA record pointing to LE.

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As a side note, this whole situation leaves me with a really weird feeling.

On one end, I will always be grateful for LE enabling tls/https generalization.

On the other, I kind of feel betrayed and/or ashamed that LE/ACME almost willingly introduced protocol flaws weakening the whole CA infrastructure and that we (me included) didn't challenge it more when LE was introduced.