Thanks to widely available HTTPS certificates, "evil hackers stealing your cookies on public Wi-Fi" is not a thing anymore.
We should definitely have a discussion about whether it's made active attacks more feasible, but I think the goal of making passive sniffing less trivial than it was before can be considered achieved.
Given that in the end, Let's Encrypt/ACME relies on PoP of a DNS domain, DNSSEC setup on the domain should have been a prerequisite.
In addition, an explicit opt-in should be required, for example, with a requirement for a CAA record pointing to LE.
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As a side note, this whole situation leaves me with a really weird feeling.
On one end, I will always be grateful for LE enabling tls/https generalization.
On the other, I kind of feel betrayed and/or ashamed that LE/ACME almost willingly introduced protocol flaws weakening the whole CA infrastructure and that we (me included) didn't challenge it more when LE was introduced.
Let's Encrypt security is a joke.
UPD: It looks like many other CAs also can be tricked to issue valid certificates to any attacker capable of doing MitM, so in general SSL infrastructure security is a joke which is proven by this incident.