The strength of priors here is that it is very easy to take intuitions and encode them statistically, in an understandable way. Taking the lower bound of a test statistic doesn't admit much in the way of intuition.
That makes for a pretty significant difference in practice, and I'm not sure which is preferable.
In all of these models, the giant variable that is completely ignored is the actual choice to rate something at all, versus skipping over it and reading the next one. That's a very significant decision that the user makes. The behavior of each of these systems w.r.t that effect will be the dominant thing differentiating them.
Here are slides from that paper's presentation, for a quicker overview: http://www.dcs.bbk.ac.uk/~dell/publications/dellzhang_ictir2...
I emailed Miller a while ago to see what he thought of this reply, and he thought it also seemed like a reasonable approach. But, in his view, the criticisms of his method within their framework include things that in practice he sees as features. In particular, they view the bias caused by using the lower bound as a bug, but he prefers rankings to be be "risk-averse" in recommending, avoiding false positives more than false negatives. Of course, that biased preference could also be encoded explicitly in a more complex Bayesian setup, which would also be a bit more principled, since you could directly choose the degree of bias, instead of indirectly choosing it via your choice of confidence level on the Wilson score interval.