What I understand the author to be saying is that the SE will unwrap locally stored synced credentials and then encrypt them to the previously-established iCloud sync key.
It doesn't really matter if the storage of the actual wrapped keys is in the secure element or on disk, of course--what matters is if the SE exports unencrypted credentials, or if it fails to validate the identity of the key to which it encrypts credentials before exporting.
It doesn't seem from that description like it does either, but it's a bit unclear to me from the docs. Do you know?
1) The key used to encrypt the keychain is stored in the secure enclave.
2) The keychain data itself is not stored in the secure enclave.
The secure enclave only stores keys, whereas the keychain holds arbitrary data of arbitrary length. If keychain data were actually stored in the secure enclave, there would be a danger of it running out of space!
https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/certifica...
"When you protect a private key with the Secure Enclave, you never handle the plain-text key, making it difficult for the key to become compromised. Instead, you instruct the Secure Enclave to create and encode the key, and later to decode and perform operations with it. You receive only the output of these operations, such as encrypted data or a cryptographic signature verification outcome."
Here's the kicker:
"Can’t encode preexisting keys. You must use the Secure Enclave to create the keys. Not having a mechanism to transfer plain-text key data into or out of the Secure Enclave is fundamental to its security."
In other words, nothing ever goes in, and nothing ever comes out. This makes syncing of secure enclave keys impossible. What can be synced are keys that are encrypted and decrypted by the secure enclave. These keys are the aforementioned "output".