Re:Debunking NIST's calculation of the Kyber-512 security level
by nvy on Tuesday October 03, 2023 @10:03PM
(#37760011)
>You mean ANSI/ISO/NIST and Dual_EC_DRBG, that everyone suspected had a backdoor before it was included as one of multiple options?
What's this snarky reply supposed to imply?
>Or the s-boxes in DES, that the NSA suggested to IBM + NIST's predecessor, so as to be resistant to then-not-widely-known differential cryptanalysis?
In your rush to write this oh-so-pithy comment, did you somehow get mixed up and think that when I wrote "Dual EC", I somehow meant s-boxes?
Re:Debunking NIST's calculation of the Kyber-512 security level
by bonzini on Wednesday October 04, 2023 @01:11AM
(#37761061)
He/she means that there is good things coming out of the NSA/NIST collaborations (another example of SHA0->SHA1, introducing a "mysterious" left shift that made SHA1 much stronger), and the bad ones are caught quickly.
Re:Debunking NIST's calculation of the Kyber-512 security level
by sneak on Tuesday October 03, 2023 @11:44PM
(#37760614)
One of those things happened after 9/11, and one of those things happened before.
There is a widely held belief that the US IC changed fundamentally in terms of their regard for their own raison d’etre that day.
Re:Debunking NIST's calculation of the Kyber-512 security level
by ethbr1 on Wednesday October 04, 2023 @01:37AM
(#37761211)
It'll be curious, looking back from the near future, what prompted the next fundamental change.
I'd like to think the US is in the midst of that now, with the Afghan withdrawal and Ukraine war.
Or the s-boxes in DES, that the NSA suggested to IBM + NIST's predecessor, so as to be resistant to then-not-widely-known differential cryptanalysis? https://web.archive.org/web/20120106042939/http://securespee...