News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:VeraCrypt: Free, open source, disk encryption for Windows... by pmontra on Monday October 02, 2023 @06:37AM (#37736400)
If there is no way to transfer the disk to another machine, it's not a disk I want to use. I think that there are very few use cases for losing all the data when a machine dies.

And if there is a procedure to let me move the disk to a new machine, somebody can wrench me until I perform that procedure for them.

Re:VeraCrypt: Free, open source, disk encryption for Windows... by dwattttt on Monday October 02, 2023 @07:06AM (#37736624)
For Bitlocker (and I imagine other tools which support TPM keying), a recovery password is generated in addition to the TPM unlock key. If the motherboard goes kaput you dig out the long key to unlock it, assuming you kept it somewhere safe (speaking as someone who has had to dig through a pile of old USBs to get access back to a disk).
Re:VeraCrypt: Free, open source, disk encryption for Windows... by robertlagrant on Monday October 02, 2023 @07:36AM (#37736863)
Sounds as though this is where the $5 wrench would work just fine.
Re:VeraCrypt: Free, open source, disk encryption for Windows... by mkopec on Monday October 02, 2023 @09:23AM (#37737733)
It's a matter of priorities, I guess?

If you want to you can just not save the recovery password. In that case I guess they'll just beat you to death with that $5 wrench.

Re:VeraCrypt: Free, open source, disk encryption for Windows... by robertlagrant on Wednesday October 04, 2023 @09:19AM (#37764689)
That's why I'd rather use a service without a recovery password :)
Re:VeraCrypt: Free, open source, disk encryption for Windows... by mkopec on Monday October 02, 2023 @09:09AM (#37737584)
With LUKS you can enroll an extra auth option in addition to TPM, like a password or a FIDO2 token.
Re:VeraCrypt: Free, open source, disk encryption for Windows... by alias_neo on Monday October 02, 2023 @09:12AM (#37737620)
> And if there is a procedure to let me move the disk to a new machine, somebody can wrench me until I perform that procedure for them.

I think the implication is that they (the attacker) don't have the machine, or you, or whatever "thing" you have/use to unlock it.

If someone stole your disk, or took a copy of it, they can't offline attack it.

An external hardware device seems preferable for this scenario; if someone steals/snatches your laptop, they won't have your Yubikey or whatever.

In any scenario where the wrenching is an option, I suspect all bets are off, but if wrenching is a real risk, and whatever you're protecting is worth taking a wrenching for (as opposed to just giving it up at the threat of a wrenching, there should probably be some tougher protections which make it clear that the wrenching will gain an attacker nothing, and hopefully save you from it to begin with.

I'm not sure what or how that would work.