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Re:The Bogus CVE Problem by cookiengineer on Friday September 22, 2023 @01:59AM (#37608393)
The personal problems I have with the NVD and CVEs in general are:

- CVEs can be disputed, and this is not based on evidence and can be marked as not affected with as little evidence as "EOL" or end-of-life. See 100% of CVEs filed against SAP, for example. All valid exploits, all work, all are used in the wild by ransomware, and all are still disputed by SAP.

- CVEs are free-form text, which makes even version strings uncomparable. Most projects down the line don't "sanitize to ASCII" and don't know about this. But there are many CVEs (~1%ish) with Chinese idiom symbols as a "." character replacement. Nobody fixes that, ever.

- CVEs and their affected hardware/software matching strings (CPEs) are utterly useless. They are an abstraction for the manual excel spreadsheet world, and literally every linux security tracker implements their own somewhat crappy parser to match against the real upstream projects, their package names and/or the source code origins (e.g. a git repo link).

- CPEs are redundant. The linux kernel itself has more than 200 different CPE strings, and none of them are recorrected after they have been filed by the reporting person. What the actual duck. Have fun trying to find out if Arch Linux is affected when the initial CVE was filed against, say, SUSE or Oracle Linux.

- Most hardware vendors wait to confirm or deny anything until their hardware is EOL. Smart, right? Nobody knows so it must be secure, right? Looking at you, Cisco, Fortinet and the like. And now you are wondering why exploits from 2016 are still used and shared in Telegram channels of ransomware developers?

- There is no mandatory PoC in the CVE database. This could change so much in the ecosystem, especially with the hardforked still-patched feature frozen packages of distributions like Debian. Debian's security tracker is littered with "marked as fixed" but actually "can't fix it because code diverged too much from upstream already" CVEs. And guess what, those are exactly those exploits used in the wild by root/bootkits.

- As the article author states, CVEs are never recorrected. This is the biggest issue of all of them. Nobody maintains a sane state of the database, even the new git repositories are buggy as hell and don't validate against their own schema. Nobody fixes those CVEs "upstream" and nobody maintains old CVEs that turn out to affect more upstream projects. Prime example is log4j, because literally almost all java software is affected when they bundle(d) it; which almost all of them do. I complained to this but basically can't or won't be fixed [2], [3], [4] because even the new schemas are experimental (for over 8 years now).

Source: am scraping literally all linux security trackers to make a better CVE database for automatic comparison purposes. And it's a super ducked state of affairs. [1]

[1] https://github.com/tholian-network/vulnerabilities

[2] https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/issues/4

[3] https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/issues/5

[4] https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/issues/6

Re:The Bogus CVE Problem by 1MachineElf on Friday September 22, 2023 @06:12AM (#37610143)
Do you have any thoughts on CVSSv4[0]? It appears to incorporate finer-grained and organization-specific scoring to address issues many have with the one size fits all approach currently used for CVEs.

[0] https://www.first.org/cvss/v4-0/

Re:The Bogus CVE Problem by cookiengineer on Friday September 22, 2023 @01:04PM (#37614577)
I've followed the CVSS discussions kind of a lot, but I don't think it will fix the issues at hand. I think it would help a lot more if a score would reflect the stakeholders at hand for a vulnerability. Stakeholders in the sense of attacker, maintainer and user.

Maybe it could be represented with a score for each of the stakeholders, like for reporter/pentester, vendor/auditor, and customer? Example score could be: 4/8/6

The problem I also have with CVSS scores in general is that they don't reflect the _type_ of vulnerability. Adjacent vulnerabilities or RCEs should be scored separately because of their huge impact they can have on the network, compared to say, a local privilege escalation exploit that is useless without an exploit from another stage.

If a vulnerability allows quick lateral movements by the threat actors, they also increase likeliness of being used by them much more.

The combination of exploits in the sense of making an exploit feasible as an attack strategy also isn't reflected correctly, and that's what analysts on the defending side like to "abuse" to argue why they are too lazy to deal with it or why they won't update their systems. Usually the argumentation is something like "yeah but it's not feasible anyways", which is BS in the age of Exploit Service telegram channels that post a corporate zero-day, every day, for free.

The problems with all SIEM/SOAR systems I've seen is that they always reflect a point in time, and a decision that was made in that point in time. They don't represent an accumulative view of what actually is vulnerable, also what is _still vulnerable_ even when there was an alert about it a year ago. Log4j's vulnerabilities are the prime example again, too, because it proves that nobody has a correct asset inventory, and 78% of enterprises are vulnerable _again_ a year later because they reintroduced the vulnerable library without the Blueteam knowing about it.

Sorry for babbling too much about this, but I think that SIEM/SOAR systems don't work in practice and I've got a harsh opinion about them. Of course they can work for some situations, but it's still a luck shot if your analyst actually is an analyst or just a paper pusher hired directly from University.

We need to increase the quality of measurements, not the amount of measurements. And that's where all SIEM systems fail at. Petabytes of data per day are pretty much the definition of a needle in a haystack, and they don't help anyone if it gets more and more. And your magical AI unicorn won't fix this either, because of lack of reliable datasets (hence the discussion about CVE).

Re:The Bogus CVE Problem by worthless-trash on Friday September 22, 2023 @08:08AM (#37610917)
As I was previously involved with Red Hats platform (I can't speak for the java stuff) up until about a year ago.

There was specific requirements to correctly understand and identify a flaw, I had disputed over 100 CVEs and corrected mitre's scoring of over 300.

Are you considering this situation in your site, when vendors (such as Red Hat) dispute a CVE or disagree with a score ?

Re:The Bogus CVE Problem by cookiengineer on Friday September 22, 2023 @08:50AM (#37611340)
Most vendors that I am scraping already have a confidence score, which is approximated on a statistical level. For example, can't trust the fixed states of Ubuntu and Debian, so they got a lower confidence score; compared to say, Arch Linux which has the highest confidence in that regard.

Matching package names overall is what I was using the CPEs for initially, but it's way too much overhead to match those in a separate database/table, because you also need to map all the vendor prefixes back to other vendors if they have the same package there. It's much easier to just match them one time and then add other package name variants incrementally.

Red Hat is actually one of the nicer ones, because they distribute their data via OVAL; which makes it easily validateable. Though I have to say that they're using the logical conditions way too often, and not in the same structure. (e.g. !this && that vs this && that)