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Re:On the Impending Crypto Monoculture (2016) by nmadden on Friday September 15, 2023 @11:35AM (#37524637)
Like much of Peter Gutmann’s writing this is a mixture of good points and things that are downright incorrect or at least misleading. For example, he criticises GCM for losing confidentiality when a nonce is reused. True, but ChaPoly has exactly the same issue. And although CBC+HMAC is somewhat better in that regard, it doesn’t “drop back to ECB mode”, and it still loses CPA security. HMAC is far more robust than any polynomial MAC, but the persistent idea that there is any meaningful difference in robustness between any of the traditional cipher modes under nonce/IV misuse is nonsense. If you need misuse resistance then use a mode that actually provides it, like SIV.
Re:On the Impending Crypto Monoculture (2016) by tptacek on Friday September 15, 2023 @11:44AM (#37524785)
I mean, he hasn't nailed the reason ChaPoly is favored over GCM, and it's not a good paragraph, but he's not wrong that GCM is ill-loved by cryptography engineers, despite its ubiquity. Really though, it's just missing an important bit of the history, which is that there was a decent stretch of years where it was basically impossible to implement GCM securely on architectures that didn't have something like the CLMUL instruction.

I don't agree with you at all about the equivalent of IV misuse under CBC+HMAC and nonce reuse under ChaPoly. It's a bug either way, and bugs in cryptosystems are bad, but it's much less bad in CBC+HMAC. That is in fact a good reason to use it.

Re:On the Impending Crypto Monoculture (2016) by nmadden on Friday September 15, 2023 @11:56AM (#37525010)
But it’s less bad because of HMAC, not because of CBC. Hand waving arguments that CBC is meaningfully better than CTR mode under IV reuse are silly. There are cases where a nonce reuse in CTR mode reveals very little (eg key wrapping) and cases where the same in CBC mode reveals everything. The worst case for both is equally bad.
Re:On the Impending Crypto Monoculture (2016) by tptacek on Friday September 15, 2023 @12:06PM (#37525182)
I still disagree with you even given this refinement. A repeated CBC IV is a second-order vulnerability that still requires you to set up the conditions for an ECB-style attack on the system, which isn't always possible. A repeated CTR nonce immediately sacrifices confidentiality.
Re:On the Impending Crypto Monoculture (2016) by nmadden on Friday September 15, 2023 @12:22PM (#37525486)
That’s not true. CBC mode with a repeated IV immediately reveals equality of plaintexts or any common prefix (modulo block size).
Re:On the Impending Crypto Monoculture (2016) by tptacek on Friday September 15, 2023 @12:45PM (#37525842)
And my claim is that is not always valuable to an attacker, whereas I can't think of an instance where a repeated CTR nonce wasn't game-over.

It's always bad. I don't want to get into a semantic argument about whether or not a repeated IV is a vulnerability. It is. But it's not as severe a vulnerability as a repeated CTR nonce, which repeats the entire keystream.

Re:On the Impending Crypto Monoculture (2016) by nmadden on Friday September 15, 2023 @01:23PM (#37526362)
> whereas I can’t think of an instance where a repeated CTR nonce wasn’t game-over.

The fact that you can’t think of an example is not a serious security argument. This is why we have rigorous security definitions rather than hand waving “I can’t think of anything” arguments, which should have died in the 90s.

I already gave you one example: key-wrapping. JOSE (of course) has a key-wrapping mode based on GCM, and at least one recent article advocates for its widespread use [1] (see recommendations at end). Despite me not agreeing with that advice, it is an example of where CTR loses no information at all under nonce reuse: the XOR of two random keys is itself indistinguishable from random.

I can certainly think of examples based on encrypting binary data streams where the XOR of plaintexts may also reveal very little. To decide whether CBC or CTR leaks more you have to consider the specifics of the application, or you have to make shaky assumptions about “typical” data. IMO those assumptions are not a good foundation for security and we should move past them.

[1]: https://scottarc.blog/2023/09/06/how-to-write-a-secure-jwt-l...

Re:On the Impending Crypto Monoculture (2016) by tptacek on Friday September 15, 2023 @04:06PM (#37528489)
You're responding to an argument I didn't make. Obviously I don't believe that repeated CBC IVs are never an exploitable vulnerability. There are famously exploitable instances; one broke TLS. I'm arguing that a repeated CBC IV is less likely to be practically exploitable than a repeated CTR nonce, which is virtually always exploitable.
Re:On the Impending Crypto Monoculture (2016) by nmadden on Friday September 15, 2023 @04:53PM (#37528997)
You previously said CTR mode nonce repetitions are “always bad” and are “game-over”. I provided a simple counterexample.

You also said that IV reuse in CBC mode can only be exploited if you setup an ECB-style attack. Also untrue.

Now you have retreated to merely claiming that CBC issues are less likely to be exploitable, but have provided absolutely zero evidence to backup that assertion. I don’t think you could really stand that up without making a bunch of assumptions about typical application data that I think are shaky.

The way to address this is not to endlessly debate the pros and cons of different confidentiality-only cipher modes. Instead, modern crypto acknowledges that none of them are CPA-secure in the case of IV reuse, and they all leak info in different ways. The best course of action is then to assume that in the worst case they are basically all terrible and design around that at higher levels: like SIV, or XChaCha, or whatever.

Re:On the Impending Crypto Monoculture (2016) by tptacek on Friday September 15, 2023 @07:12PM (#37530191)
I didn't catch the CTR bit in your key wrap example. To be honest, when people start talking about key wrapping, I stop paying attention.

We just disagree. You have a purer take on this stuff. My personal experience, which is that of a vulnerability researcher and not that of a cryptography engineer, is that the purity test perspective is helpful for spotting patterns of vulnerability, but that's about it. It's demonstrably safer to run a CBC+HMAC authenticated secure channel than to run a GCM secure channel, and lots of people do exactly that for exactly that reason. The purity test vantage says "feh! the same bug exists in both!". The vulnerability researcher vantage says "no, all bugs are not in fact the same".

It's fine that we disagree.

Re:On the Impending Crypto Monoculture (2016) by nullc on Friday September 15, 2023 @11:30PM (#37531793)
In practice nonce reuse with CTR+GCM virtually always results in an obvious exploitable vulnerability. With CBC+HMAC nonce reuse sometimes results in an obvious exploitable vulnerability but often results in a system which has unclear security properties but which isn't known to be practically exploitable under common use (and may even still be provably secure under after careful analysis).

In other words, if the latter system is flawed it ends up having the sort of security properties more akin to physical security rather than the strong mathematical assurances we expect from cryptographic systems.

Given the high rate of issues with nonce mishandling in real systems, even ones that appeared to be carefully engineered, it shouldn't be hard to understand why systems engineers (as opposed to, say, cryptographic researchers) would have an unambiguous preference for one over another when it comes to practical systems, at least if all else were equal (which, of course, it seldom is!).

> IMO those assumptions are not a good foundation for security and we should move past them.

No one here is advocating that using CBC with intentional potential IV reuse is good security. But defense in depth is a good security practice and using primitives that fail less catastrophically when inevitable disasters happen is also a good security practice.

This is doubly so because there we know that that some sophisticated attackers have been known to exploit the brittleness of otherwise secure schemes to compromise implementations. Brittleness doesn't just increase exposure to chance it also makes it easier to inject bugdoors and to plausibly deny them.

Re:On the Impending Crypto Monoculture (2016) by nmadden on Saturday September 16, 2023 @01:20AM (#37532255)
Comparing GCM to CBC+HMAC is not fruitful because they are different in too many aspects. I already stated in the very first message in this thread that HMAC is far more robust than GMAC. Compare CTR+HMAC vs CBC+HMAC.

What I take issue with is people stating that CBC somehow provides more security than CTR mode under IV reuse. (Ie your statement that it provides defence in depth). That is a statement that doesn’t stand up to scrutiny in any rigorous way. Both fail pretty badly. Learning the XOR of two plaintexts is sometimes worse than learning if they share a common prefix, sometimes not.

Put it another way, how would using CBC vs CTR mode in any way impact your response to learning you had a IV reuse bug in production? It wouldn’t in any meaningful way at all - you’d still have to assume that the data was compromised to some degree. Compare that to a real defence in depth like SIV mode, where in most cases (not all) you could assume that no data breach occurred.

Thomas Ptacek thinks that I’m being a purist about this stuff. Fair enough. But I think people who believe that CBC provides meaningfully better protection than CTR in the real world are kidding themselves.

Re:On the Impending Crypto Monoculture (2016) by marcosdumay on Friday September 15, 2023 @01:54PM (#37526772)
Why are we so concerned with nonce misuse anyway? I understood it at the time when nonces had complex rules, and when they were created deterministically. But nowadays it's pretty standard that modern algorithms work jut fine with completely random nonces, and it's pretty standard that you make them this way.

It being standard, they just come packed with the algorithm. IMO, worrying about bugs there makes exactly as much sense as worrying about bugs on the main algorithm. There's no reason to single them out.

Re:On the Impending Crypto Monoculture (2016) by nmadden on Friday September 15, 2023 @02:31PM (#37527309)
There are several reasons. Off the top of my head:

1. People use bad PRNGs or otherwise mess this up so the nonces aren’t as random as they should be, or they use ciphers with small nonce spaces (eg original ChaCha with 64-bit nonces) and generate enough nonces that collisions become likely.

2. Even if you use a larger nonce space, like GCM’s usual 96-bits, you may be Google and generate so many nonces so quickly that collisions even then become likely. (This is generally not a problem for >128 bit nonces though). See the rationale for the development of AES-GCM-SIV for an example.

3. If you generate a random nonce then you have to send that nonce on the wire, which adds overhead (e.g. 16 bytes per message). If you send a lot of small messages or have strict space limits then you might not want this overhead, leading back to deterministic nonce generation.

4. There are a lot of existing crypto protocols in use, and almost all of them use deterministic nonces. We’re not going to just replace them all overnight with random nonce variants.

Re:On the Impending Crypto Monoculture (2016) by panax on Friday September 15, 2023 @02:50PM (#37527574)
Also nonce misuse is a common failure mode among novices who might not understand what a nonce is supposed to be. People do all kinds of mistakes including using hardcoded static nonces. Its also fairly easy to come up with a bad protocol where someone can trick you into nonce reuse. Or there is a complicated error path that might involve a device going through reset where a nonce reuse might occur. Some of these are not so trivial to identify either.
Re:On the Impending Crypto Monoculture (2016) by tptacek on Friday September 15, 2023 @04:08PM (#37528513)
This is a question with a simple answer. The most popular nonce-based AEAD is GCM, which has only the AES block size to fit both a nonce and a counter, which doesn't leave enough headroom to comfortably use random nonces. As a result, people build elaborate schemes to generate deterministic fresh nonces, and when those break, GCM breaks.