Re:Deep dive into the UK air traffic control meltdown
by sheepshear on Monday September 11, 2023 @05:09PM
(#37473743)
Failing over is correct because there's no way to discern that the hardware is not at fault. They should have designed a better response to the second failure to avoid the knock-on effects.
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Re:Deep dive into the UK air traffic control meltdown
by anentropic on Tuesday September 12, 2023 @05:13AM
(#37478511)
I don't think anything in this incident pointed to a hardware fault
The software raised an exception because a "// TODO: this should never happen" case happened
A hardware fault would look like machines not talking to each other or corrupted data file unreadable
Re:Deep dive into the UK air traffic control meltdown
by sheepshear on Tuesday September 12, 2023 @07:40AM
(#37479548)
Upon inspection it was evidently not a hardware failure. The computer didn't know that at the time, and hardware failure can look like anything, so it was correct to exercise its only option.