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Re:TPM provides zero practical security by completelylegit on Friday September 08, 2023 @01:51PM (#37436963)
TPM isn’t about security, it’s about DRM
Re:TPM provides zero practical security by etna_ramequin on Friday September 08, 2023 @02:14PM (#37437252)
I’ve seen many widely deployed applications of TPM for security, never for DRM.
Re:TPM provides zero practical security by sudosysgen on Friday September 08, 2023 @02:45PM (#37437678)
You've never used Widevine? If you ever tried to use a streaming website, you almost certainly did.

EDIT: To clarify, Widevine doesn't actually use the TPM, but Widevine L2 uses a TEE for key exchange and decryption, which are all things that modern TPMs support. The use a crypto coprocessor for key exchange and decryption is widely used.

Re:TPM provides zero practical security by lxgr on Friday September 08, 2023 @02:52PM (#37437777)
Are you sure Widevine uses the attestation functionalities of a TPM on Windows?

I thought Widevine on computers (whether Windows, macOS or Linux) is always L3, i.e. software only, and L1 needs a TEE on Android or an embedded OS such as on a set top box or streaming dongle.

Re:TPM provides zero practical security by sudosysgen on Friday September 08, 2023 @03:01PM (#37437897)
Indeed, it doesn't use it on Windows. Widevine L2 however uses the TEE in exactly the same way as a TPM is used, for attestation and for cryptography (you can do AES decryption using a TPM).
Re:TPM provides zero practical security by lxgr on Friday September 08, 2023 @03:11PM (#37438030)
A TPM isn't the same thing as a TEE at all. You can't run copy protection logic in a TPM, for example. The two are complementary, though:

A TEE can run "trusted" logic, such as DRM decryption code, and you can use a TPM-like device to hold the attestation keys and measurement funcitonalities for the TEE. I'm saying "TPM-like" because some TEEs have their own proprietary or embedded secure elements and don't need a TPM proper. (I'm actually not sure if TPMs are "TEE-aware", which would be required to e.g. only let some keys be used from the secure context, as otherwise storing DRM keys in the generally-accessible portion defeats the purpose.)

Without a TEE (and a TPM itself does not imply one on x86), what you can do is declare your entire system a TEE, and then use the TPMs measurements as an assertion over that system's untampered state.

This is pretty infeasible to do securely though, given the size of the codebase of most OSes, which is why the "DRM in TEE" approach is much more common. That's what Android does, for example.

Re:TPM provides zero practical security by tredre3 on Friday September 08, 2023 @03:25PM (#37438218)
Please stop spreading FUD.
Re:TPM provides zero practical security by adrr on Friday September 08, 2023 @02:43PM (#37437662)
DRM like full disk encryption, passkeys, etc. What DRM actually uses TPM? Pretty sure wildvine or any other common DRM tech use it to wrap the encryption of the stream. Why would it need?
Re:TPM provides zero practical security by lxgr on Friday September 08, 2023 @02:49PM (#37437740)
No, TPM can be about both – and more.
Re:TPM provides zero practical security by etna_ramequin on Friday September 08, 2023 @05:28PM (#37439668)
In theory, yes. In practice, TCBs are so big, that DRM solutions based on it are nearly meaningless for general purpose computers.