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Re:A Study of Malicious Code in PyPI Ecosystem by simonw on Friday September 08, 2023 @12:38PM (#37435924)
They're not lightweight and easy enough to use.

I have Docker on my Mac. I run things in it if I have to, but it's pretty resource heavy and I have to look at my notes every time I want to run "docker run".

Plus Docker isn't actually a fully secure sandbox!

There's Firecracker, which I believe is secure (AWS built it for Lambda after all) but good luck figuring out how to run that on a Mac.

I want something that's tiny, fast, ridiculously easy to use and that I can run dozens if not hundreds of instances.

WebAssembly is almost that thing.

Re:A Study of Malicious Code in PyPI Ecosystem by ashishbijlani on Friday September 08, 2023 @01:09PM (#37436346)
> There's Firecracker, which I believe is secure (AWS built it for Lambda after all) but good luck figuring out how to run that on a Mac.

Then, how about using AWS Lambda for your use case?

Re:A Study of Malicious Code in PyPI Ecosystem by simonw on Friday September 08, 2023 @02:45PM (#37437686)
I want to run code on my own laptop and phone.
Re:A Study of Malicious Code in PyPI Ecosystem by ashishbijlani on Friday September 08, 2023 @03:39PM (#37438401)
Makes sense. When I read your notes, it appeared that you wanted to run untrusted code on a backend server.
Re:A Study of Malicious Code in PyPI Ecosystem by simonw on Friday September 08, 2023 @03:50PM (#37438548)
Yeah, I want to do that as well! And Lambda is definitely high on my list of potential solutions for that.

I'm still hoping for a solution to the run-on-personal-devices problem though.

Re:A Study of Malicious Code in PyPI Ecosystem by g_p on Friday September 08, 2023 @01:59PM (#37437071)
Interestingly, Docker on Mac actually runs lightweight VM, which then runs a whole Linux OS inside it, to then run your containers.

From an isolation perspective, that's giving you hypervisor level isolation which is a step above most container-based solutions, which you point out rightly isn't a full sandbox. A hypervisor with CPU support is probably the gold standard for isolation, asides from running it on a separate physically isolated system.

Re:A Study of Malicious Code in PyPI Ecosystem by rrherr on Friday September 08, 2023 @06:59PM (#37440334)
Agreed about Docker.

Personally, I use Google Colab for my convenient, lightweight Python sandbox. But I’d rather not depend on Google. It feels weird that this is my best option for now.

Re:A Study of Malicious Code in PyPI Ecosystem by Intralexical on Friday September 08, 2023 @09:20PM (#37441249)
> Personally, I use Google Colab for my convenient, lightweight Python sandbox. But I’d rather not depend on Google. It feels weird that this is my best option for now.

`bwrap` is great for this on Linux. A one line alias should let you run any program in a lightweight and highly customizable sandbox safely-ish. See my reply to the parent comment for an example.

Re:A Study of Malicious Code in PyPI Ecosystem by Intralexical on Friday September 08, 2023 @09:14PM (#37441225)
> They're not lightweight and easy enough to use.

```

$ alias SafeRun="bwrap --ro-bind / / --dev /dev --proc /proc --unshare-all --tmpfs ~ --bind ~/Untrusted ~/Untrusted"

$ SafeRun python3 ~/Untrusted/RandomScript.py

$ SafeRun ~/Untrusted/RandomExecutable

```

This is basically manually invoking what Flatpak does:

https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap

This is also useful for more than just security. E.G., you can test how your app would behave on a fresh install by masking your user configuration files. I personally also have a tool that uses it to basically bundle all dependencies from an entire Linux distribution in order to make highly portable AppImages— Been meaning to post that, will get around to it eventually maybe.

The flags above should hide your user data (`--tmpfs`), disable network access (`--unshare-all`), hide/virtualize devices and OS state (`--dev` and `--proc`), and make the rest of the root filesystem read-only (`--ro-bind`­— Including the insecure X11 socket in `/tmp`, which you might want to expose for GUI apps).

Check them against `bwrap --help`; I might have omitted one or two more things you'd need.