Re:Short session expiration does not help security
by MattPalmer1086 on Saturday August 19, 2023 @06:55AM
(#37187454)
The closest security generally gets to "quantitative" techniques is in applying risk management to threat models.
But the way risk is managed in the industry (multiplying likelihood and impact) is completely incoherent and voodoo. See the book "How to Measure Anything in Cybersecurity Risk" [1] for a good explanation of why it doesn't work and better ways to do it.
Which is a long way of saying, no, security doesn't use quantitative techniques mostly, but it would be possible if people understood how to measure and manage risk properly.
[1] https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/97811198923...
In some sense, the problem is that the goal is zero controls breaking, but of course, that also provides no information on security. Intuitively, it would seem that parameterizing security (in a diagnostically useful way) would also require a number of quite different measures. For instance, it matters who (how sophisticated and motivated) your attackers are. And some of the parameterization would be based on use - every time you force someone to type a fixed password, that password is more exposed. Combining all these quantities would just be Bayes-based.
I think an exercise like this could be instructive. For instance, short sessions mean more authentications and both usability and failure modes. But they also mean that an attacker would need to wait until the next session, or have a smaller chance of hitting a session. Again, these are quantifiable, at least in rough terms. And this kind of analysis does expose some additional questions: eg that short sessions make no sense without guaranteeing the security of the client system (ideally by reinstallation from known-good reference).
At least in my experience, "security people"