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Re:Russia starts blocking VPN at the protocol (WireGuard, Op... by vbezhenar on Thursday August 10, 2023 @07:08AM (#37074566)
DPI. Popular VPN protocols are easily identified by first connection packet signature.
Re:Russia starts blocking VPN at the protocol (WireGuard, Op... by littlestymaar on Thursday August 10, 2023 @07:14AM (#37074618)
Wasn't Wireguard explicitly designed to avoid that? (IIRC it took lots of inspiration from state of the art data exfiltration methods used by malware)
Re:Russia starts blocking VPN at the protocol (WireGuard, Op... by Starmina on Thursday August 10, 2023 @07:39AM (#37074834)
Not at all, WireGuard is secure, but very easily identifiable.
Re:Russia starts blocking VPN at the protocol (WireGuard, Op... by bogantech on Thursday August 10, 2023 @07:18AM (#37074645)
IDK but Wireshark has no problem identifying it so there must be something that gives it away
Re:Russia starts blocking VPN at the protocol (WireGuard, Op... by Aissen on Thursday August 10, 2023 @08:52AM (#37075525)
They even have a nice comment explaining the heuristic: https://github.com/wireshark/wireshark/blob/ef9c79ae81b00a63...

     * Heuristics to detect the WireGuard protocol:
     * - The first byte must be one of the valid four messages.
     * - The total packet length depends on the message type, and is fixed for
     *   three of them. The Data type has a minimum length however.
     * - The next three bytes are reserved and zero in the official protocol.
     *   Cloudflare's implementation however uses this field for load balancing
     *   purposes, so this condition is not checked here for most messages.
     *   It is checked for data messages to avoid false positives.
Re:Russia starts blocking VPN at the protocol (WireGuard, Op... by vbezhenar on Thursday August 10, 2023 @07:46AM (#37074886)
https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/

The initiator sends this message:

  msg = handshake_initiation {
    u8 message_type
    u8 reserved_zero[3]
    u32 sender_index
    u8 unencrypted_ephemeral[32]
    u8 encrypted_static[AEAD_LEN(32)]
    u8 encrypted_timestamp[AEAD_LEN(12)]
    u8 mac1[16]
    u8 mac2[16]
  }

  msg.message_type = 1
  msg.reserved_zero = { 0, 0, 0 }
Seems like this is trivially detected. Just watch for first UDP packet with 01-00-00-00 bytes in the payload.
Re:Russia starts blocking VPN at the protocol (WireGuard, Op... by fruitreunion1 on Thursday August 10, 2023 @08:37AM (#37075423)
No. https://www.wireguard.com/known-limitations/

>Deep Packet Inspection

>WireGuard does not focus on obfuscation. Obfuscation, rather, should happen at a layer above WireGuard, with WireGuard focused on providing solid crypto with a simple implementation. It is quite possible to plug in various forms of obfuscation, however.

>TCP Mode

>WireGuard explicitly does not support tunneling over TCP, due to the classically terrible network performance of tunneling TCP-over-TCP. Rather, transforming WireGuard's UDP packets into TCP is the job of an upper layer of obfuscation (see previous point), and can be accomplished by projects like udptunnel and udp2raw.