Laws are generated by a largely accretive process. The corresponding ablative process is missing. I wonder if this is key to the imbalance?
In this case, it's unnecessary to make a leap from government gaining control to corporations gaining control, since patents are created and enforced by governments, not corporations. On top of that, a corporation is by definition an entity created by a government.
"So the author's reliance on this de facto "rule not to litigate" is flawed."
And also historically ignorant. Yahoo did the same thing to Google when they went public in 2004. Somehow the world didn't end.
No, they didn't. Your memory of history is incorrect.
Overture, a completely different company, sued Google in 2002, two years before their IPO.
Yahoo purchased Overture in 2003. After this, Google settled.
Google's IPO wasn't until 2004.
Thx for correction.
Google reveals that Y! did sue X-fire apparently over a buddy list patent in 2005 which would also make the same point though.
Absolutely. I should make it clear: I am not defending Yahoo's behavior here. Just trying to keep the facts factual.
>they have a fiduciary duty of care to the corporation
I absolutely agree. if you're the CEO of a publicly traded company, it is your fiduciary duty to extract value from the company's assets.
Exhibit #1: Sun Microsystems
if Sun had the cojones to sue Google (re: Java/Android) they'd still be in business today.
Notwithstanding the foreseeability of patent warfare, I remain despondent toward "unwritten rules" in American law. Yes, they exist; it's no surprise that defendants in criminal cases who assert their 6th Amendment rights to a speedy trial that they subsequently lose will suffer a heightened penalty. The seminal case on this subject, Bordenkircher v. Hayes, specifically endorses threats of stiffer sentences to entice criminal defendants to waive their right to trial and plead guilty to a lesser offense. One can model this as a game of imperfect information, with society reaping the rewards.
So the author's reliance on this de facto "rule not to litigate" is flawed. The real problem arises when companies exclude others from practicing a technology in which that company's property interest is a mere subterfuge. Rarely do companies practice the technologies for which they've secured patent protection, and that brings me to my last Thomas Jefferson quote:
However, we should be careful not to criticize the managers of these companies too much: they have a fiduciary duty of care to the corporation. Is there another "unwritten rule" that shareholders of a (struggling) corporation won't launch a derivative suit against the board of directors for failure to assert the corporation's patent rights against an infringing third party?So in my view, the solution isn't at the corporate level; it's at the national level. As such, patent reform should be a national issue addressed by politicians. Patent term length [c|sh]ould be proportional to the research expenses actually incurred. Alternatively, we might want want a "patent abandonment doctrine" that moves to public domain those patents whose rights haven't been enforced (almost like in trademark law). Even still, we might want to wholly abandon the right to transfer or sell patents (and for that matter, all intellectual property) entirely. I haven't researched the ramifications of these potential solutions, so they're offered merely as points for discussion.