The point is that you as an individual playing a repeated game don't get to meaningfully sample the expected value of the distribution. You only get to sample once, and you will almost surely (i.e. with probability approaching 1 as n goes to infinity) sample a point in the distribution where you lose nearly all of your money.
And the answer is yes - with probability approaching 1 as n increases (ie excluding a portion of the distribution whose measure decreases to 0), the random process matches a deterministic process which is described by "you lose 5% each round".
I asked a friend who is an econ professor "Why does this Peters guy explain this so poorly" and his response was more or less, yes, all of economics has been wondering that too since he first published his Nature Physics paper on this a decade ago.
This quote tells you all you need to know about the author's ability to understand things:
"my second criticism is more severe and I’m unable to resolve it: in maximizing the expectation value — an ensemble average over all possible outcomes of the gamble — expected utility theory implicitly assumes that individuals can interact with copies of themselves, effectively in parallel universes (the other members of the ensem- ble)."
Try 225% * 90% * 90% * 36% to get the expected value.
[Edit: delete bad math]
heads: double your money tails: lose all your money
in which case the expected value is always $1, as you have a 1/2^n chance of having $2^n dollars after n rounds, and 0 otherwise.
The point of discussing ergodicity here, however, is whether you can describe the behavior of the iterated distribution deterministically if you exclude a portion of that distribution which has measure zero.
The author seems to be confusing mode and mean; the modal path does approach zero.