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Re:NASA mistakenly severs communication to Voyager 2 by sheepshear on Tuesday August 01, 2023 @09:35AM (#36955777)
I've done for NASA what they were calling FMECA and FTA for a subsystem. They had a lot of freedom to tailor the analysis to the situation, and the end result didn't quite match anything established. We addressed detection in some of the FMECA columns which were not exclusively for detection; and events in some of the FTA. It was a contortion to maximize the value of the analysis given their limited resources and the bureaucracy of what they were allowed/required to do on paper.

Here's how I would describe the possible analysis approaches in broad terms.

* Start from the hazard of being pointed in the wrong direction and work backwards to identify the causes, forming a tree.

* Start from the event of commanding the wrong direction and work forwards to identify mitigations or the lack thereof, also forming a tree.

* Start from looking at a component or subsystem, list all the ways it can fail without regard for the application, and then consider the application work up towards the causes/events.

* Close any gaps between the top-down and bottom-up approaches.

Re:NASA mistakenly severs communication to Voyager 2 by bumby on Tuesday August 01, 2023 @09:58AM (#36956030)
Yes, what you're describing is two different approaches for safety analysis. According to the NASA software engineering handbook [1]

"Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) is a top-down approach to failure analysis which begins with thinking about potential failures or malfunctions (What could go wrong?) and then thinking through all the possible ways that such a failure or malfunction could occur. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), is often used by the hardware teams to identify potential hazards that might be caused by failures in hardware components or systems, but with the SFTA, the software isn’t considered the hazard, but it can be a cause or contributor when considered in the context of the system."

"The Software Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (SFMEA) is a bottom up approach where each component is examined and all the possible ways it can fail are listed. Each possible failure is traced through the system to see what effect it might have on the system and to determine if it results in a hazardous state. Then the likelihood of the failure and the severity of the system failure can be considered."

But, to the earlier post, these are driven by hard requirements; specifically adherence to NASA STD 7150.2 and NPR 7150.2. Developers/contractors can tailor/waive them with pre-approval but, in general, they tend to go in the direction of less requirements, not more. This may all be moot because I think Voyager pre-dates any of those requirement documents and I'm not sure what existed in the late 1970s.

[1] https://swehb.nasa.gov/

Re:NASA mistakenly severs communication to Voyager 2 by sheepshear on Tuesday August 01, 2023 @01:58PM (#36959766)
The D aspect of the FMEA I worked on was motivated by a reliability requirement, not by 7150.2. 70's NASA was using FTA and FMEA but avoiding putting numbers on top-level analysis. I imagine they did whatever ad-hoc analysis they thought was necessary for such a highly publicized mission even if it wasn't a separate deliverable.
Re:NASA mistakenly severs communication to Voyager 2 by aetherspawn on Wednesday August 02, 2023 @11:16PM (#36980944)
This thread was a good read, thanks.