How this definition changes has a lot to do with technology, society, and human nature. That last one gets pretty close to 'natural law', but there's a lot more going on there as well.
Interestingly, there have been a number of attempts to reduce property rights to first principles. Modern Libertarians often consider property rights to be the first principle, but older classical liberal philosophers such a Locke believed that property was an offshoot of labor. That is, man has a right to product of his own labor and only by labor and continuous use can he claim to properly own something. I think this approach has some merit as it neatly gives voice to one of the reasons we feel that some forms of theft is justified and others are not.
I'd argue that most libertarians would adhere to the first view, which roots the moral principle in a manifest social context - i.e. the the harm one does to others - as opposed to the latter view, which roots the moral principle in a more solipsistic context - which I assume the be the psychic or spiritual harm one does to oneself. (This is expressed in consequentialist terms, of course, but I'd expect there to be an equivalent deontological dichotomy).
It's probably valid to describe the former as a Lockean view, but I don't see how it could justify the extension of property rights to non-rival and intangible goods, such as ideas, since it's literally impossible to deprive anyone of them in the first place.
Using statute law to impose restrictions and obligations on others in order to protect some imagined entitlement to a positive return amounts to externalizing your risk and forcing others to bear it for you.
You're completely entitled to enjoy the fruits of your labor after applying your energies to create the book, those fruits being the book itself and the utility that owning it provides to you, which you literally cannot be deprived of due to the non-rival intangible nature of the product (considering that 'book' refers to the conceptual content rather than its physical encoding).
The financial return that you obtain by selling your book to others, however, is entirely dependent on their willingness to pay you, which they have no obligation to do in any case, and for which it can't be said that you have any inherent right.
Copyright is no such thing; most copyrighted works don't have a positive financial return. The only "entitlement" being asserted is literally the right to copy: if I create a book, which is the fruit of my intellectual labor, I then have the right to exchange or extend or license the right to copy that book on whatever commercial, ideological, or personal terms are mutually agreeable to others, and to copy my book without such an agreement is to violate that right.
Again, I'm not saying this is my argument or my personal opinion about copyright. My approach to these issues is more pragmatic and realpolitik and less natural law. I am saying that there is a credible natural law argument to copyright.
Your argument--that an author still has the right to possess and enjoy the book that he has written--is insufficient as a response, since nearly all property rights extend beyond mere possession and enjoyment. That was the point of the house example. If I make a capital investment in building a house in hopes of selling it, and the state seizes my title without compensation but offers to let me live in the house rent-free in perpetuity, John Locke and most proponents of the natural law theory would be very displeased about the situation. On the other hand, if I make a capital investment in building a house in hopes of selling it and I end up losing hundreds of thousands of dollars because it is the year 2010 and the housing bubble burst in the middle of construction, John Locke and most proponents of the natural law theory can only shake their heads and tell me I'm screwed.
And how does the right to control the downstream copying of the work emanate from the right to enjoy the fruits of your own labor?
The point I'm making is that the direct product of your work is the book itself and nothing more; the right to enjoy that product literally cannot be taken away from you. Other people's copying activities do nothing to diminish your ability to enjoy the direct utility value of the book itself - copying can only diminish the potential return available to you from selling your book to others, but you never had a positive right to a market return in the first place.
The argument you're making requires that there's already some legal mechanism by which you can restrain others from copying your work. Your reasoning is circular.
Because the fruits of my (intellectual) labor are the (intellectual) property of the book itself--the unique arrangement of words and images and so forth. Since I created that arrangement, since that arrangement is the fruit of my labor, by natural law I have property rights to it.
Keep in mind, I'm only arguing that such an argument could credibly be made. I'm not committing to the idea that it works out in the long run--part of the problem with the natural law approach is that you get caught in all kinds of logical ruts without any concern for what works, and frankly there's a lot about copyright that doesn't work.
> The point I'm making is that the direct product of your work is the book itself and nothing more; the right to enjoy that product literally cannot be taken away from you.
Property rights extend beyond private enjoyment. Asked and answered.
> Other people's copying activities do nothing to diminish your ability to enjoy the direct utility value of the book itself - copying can only diminish the potential return available to you from selling your book to others, but you never had a positive right to a market return in the first place.
I never said there was a "positive right to a market return"; that was the entire point of the house example. Asked and answered.
> The argument you're making requires that there's already some legal mechanism by which you can restrain others from copying your work.
All property rights require some legal mechanism to be enforceable. Without deeds and titles I couldn't even own my house. Asked and answered. You're just repeating yourself without understanding any of my points.
And since it's quite literally impossible for you to be deprived of that particular arrangement of words, images, etc., it's physically impossible for your right to be violated.
But you're not claiming just that limited property right; you're saying that you ought to be entitled to restrict others from independently creating their own replica of that arrangement of words, images, etc. which goes far beyond the scope of property rights.
> Property rights extend beyond private enjoyment. Asked and answered.
Into what other areas, then? I'm construing 'private enjoyment' here as the ability to direct the disposition of the associated property without restraint; but how does this extend to directing the disposition of other people's replicas of your property? How does it apply to inherently intangible and non-rival goods?
> I never said there was a "positive right to a market return"; that was the entire point of the house example.
The house example was a non-sequitur. In your example, the state seized your house from you and rented it back to you; they took something that was physically owned by you, and imposed their own constraints on its use and disposition. This is a clear violation of your rights. Again, I'm not seeing how it at all compares to other people independently creating a replica of something you own without imposing any constraints on you.
The only effect third-party copying can have on you is the alteration of external market conditions, potentially reducing the financial return you can obtain from selling copies of the work yourself; but again, you never had any right to guaranteed financial returns, so no right of yours is actually being violated here.
> All property rights require some legal mechanism to be enforceable.
Absolutely false. Physical property is inherently tangible and rival, meaning that only a finite number of individuals can control its disposition at any one time; it's therefore impossible for physical property to exist without someone establishing decisive control over it (or it being abandoned, in which case you might say it's not 'property' at all).
Now, people may seek to embody the process by which people establish decisive control over physical property in some sort of deliberative or judicial context, in order to reduce the possibility of disruption of their social groups arising from property disputes, but it would be inaccurate to suggest that without such a system, the concept of property would simply not exist.
> Without deeds and titles I couldn't even own my house.
No. Deeds and titles are post-hoc formalizations that recognize property rights; they aren't the primordial source of property rights.
Look, I'm tired of repeating myself, and you're either not understanding my argument or too tendentious to even try. I don't even believe in natural law, and I think it's possible to use natural law to argue either side of the copyright dispute. If you want to obsessively argue that the natural law justification for copyright is wrong from a natural law standpoint, I honestly don't give a damn. My point is that such an argument can be made, and the fact that we are repeating ourselves to each other only proves my point.
If you want to discuss this further, my email address is in my profile.
One can only expect to command a copyright-level price for a copy if other people obey a copyright-like law to not make other copies.
But that is just going in circles. One cannot justify something based on itself.
For what it's worth, I don't actually agree with this argument; I was just pointing out that it's possible to use natural law to argue in favor of intellectual property rights.
The notion that property has value is pretty much a universal concept.
But he kind of misses the other half - rivalry.
Goods can also be rivalrous or non-rivalrous. Ideas are non-rivalrous as you don't lose anything (except a competitive advantage) if other people also have it. In fact, IP may be the opposite to rivalrous (which is a rare enough thing to not have a name, though I like the name "network goods"), because it's worth more if everyone has it. If more people can speak a language, it's more useful to everyone. The Lord of the Rings is more interesting if you can talk to your friends about it.
While there's a good reason to try to make common goods (rivalrous but non-excludable) goods more excludable (by introducing laws which prevent over-exploitation), it's perverse to make non-rivalrous excludable. You don't tax breathing if there's plenty of air.
The main reason you want to make a public (non-rivalrous non-excludable) good more excludable is to incentize its creation (another reason might be because it's judged to be a "de-merit" (bad) good - such as a porn or a method of manufacturing weapons). But since IP is an input to creating IP, there's very good reasons why you want to make copyright and patents expire in a short time - bringing down the cost of creating new IP may outweigh the lost incentive. Also, the anti-rivalrous nature of IP may even encourage people to make more, simply because it's so useful have more people using it - Linus got his own private kernel debugged and extended at a lower cost by sharing it.
"The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political; but only positive law, which preserves its force long after the reasons, occasion, and time itself from whence it was created, is erased from memory: it's so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law."
That's not to say we're living in the age of post-scarcity. Most of our resources are still limited, and you're right that non-digital resources are likely to retain scarcity for a very long time. Furthermore, post-scarcity will never arrive for inherently limited resources, such as time.
But PG's essay addresses industries selling digital products, and within that realm, post-scarcity has indeed arrived.
I think it would be more correct to write "reproduction" or "distribution", because it costs a lot to produce a movie or a book or a big, complex piece of software.
I must be doing it wrong because I don't know how to copy bits for free, let alone distribute them for free. I'm in good company - neither Amazon nor Apple knows how to do those things for free either. (The fact that their current costs may be dominated by billing doesn't imply that billing is their only cost.)
When you stop trying to impose artificial scarcity and simply try to distribute with the lowest possible marginal cost (things like Project Gutenberg or Bittorrent), you find that even if the marginal cost is not exactly zero, it is close enough that the marginal cost does not affect the pricing across any real-world range of quantities. Thus, the traditional supply/demand model no longer applies.
Oh really? You think that Apple and Amazon don't care about their bandwidth charges? That will be news to the folks from whom they buy bandwidth. You also think that they don't care about the cost of the servers to send that content out?
> you find that even if the marginal cost is not exactly zero, it is close enough that the marginal cost does not affect the pricing across any real-world range of quantities.
There's your problem - you think that when the cost is minimal, supply/demand doesn't apply.
Your "economics" is several decades out of date. Lots of things aren't priced by cost, but by value. Supply/demand works just fine for them.
> When you stop trying to impose artificial scarcity and simply try to distribute with the lowest possible marginal cost (things like Project Gutenberg or Bittorrent)
Ah, you think that bittorrent is cost-efficient. It isn't. It's a way to spread infrastructure costs across a lot of people.
In other words, you're confusing cost and price again.
I really didn't say that, and you know it.
Apple and Amazon don't want to have a very high marginal cost, but they really don't mind small costs like credit card transaction fees. They don't need to eliminate those costs in order to be profitable. Minimizing their marginal costs is not their top priority.
> I really didn't say that, and you know it.
The person who wrote "They are in the business of distributing digital goods with the highest marginal price possible, so they have little incentive to reduce their marginal costs as much as possible." either thinks that bandwidth costs aren't marginal costs for content distribution or did write that A&A don't care about bandwidth charges.
> They don't need to eliminate those costs in order to be profitable.
So? Lots of companies are profitable without eliminating certain costs, but that doesn't imply that they don't care about those costs.
You seem to think that a company that has "enough" margin doesn't, or shouldn't, care about costs. Some evidence would be nice.
> Minimizing their marginal costs is not their top priority.
Move those goal posts.
And you can get more books than you will ever have the time for of project Gutenberg (and some of them can be read on your kindle).
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EDIT (in response to parent's edit #1): Everyone -- utilitarians, legal positivists, conventionalists, etc. -- thinks that the law should adjust to certain realities. Likewise, the parent's definition of "rules that humans...would voluntarily adopt" is orthogonal to questions about the source and authority of the law.
I am very sympathetic to natural law but PG's piece doesn't really strike me as falling one way or the other on this issue.
See also this comment and PG's response: http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3694703 -- nothing to do with scarcity or technology, there.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_law
The basic idea is that good laws are things we discover rather than create. Their form is dictated by the form of our being and intellect and the shape of our world. Any enforced law that contradicts this natural law will create the sort of friction and injustice that we would have seen with SOPA.
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Edit #1.1: As others have pointed out on this thread, the idea of owning non-scarce and easily-spread things is unnatural. So if technology makes a previously containable and scarce thing non-containable and non-scarce, then our ideas about what exactly can be property will change without having to believe that natural law itself had to change. This is the essence of Paul's argument, and why it fits with natural law theory. Technology changes the shape of our world.
Edit #2: All modern natural law thinkers I know of would assert that slavery always violated natural law in perhaps the worst way possible, so I don't see how Paul's concurrence that ending slavery was a good change in property law distances his position from natural law theory. It was always unnatural, and eventually we discovered and corrected that in our statute laws, prompted largely by the growing friction our divergence from natural law was creating.
Edit #3: There are various schools of natural law. My definition of it goes along the lines of, "the rules that humans living in a particular environment, starting with no preconceived notions, would voluntarily and near-universally adopt for their mutual benefit." If you're from a school that believes natural law exists without any reference to our environment, then you may disagree with my premise and everything that extends from it.