Australia is also still remote. It is literally far away from mostly things. Compare Canada, similar in size/resources/people/politics but geographically much closer to centers of power. Canada has more to fear.

It has Indonesia immediately to its north with a population of 275 million, it's not far away from potential trouble.

That’s not a fair characterization. Indonesia has suffered at the hands of two empires, first the Dutch then the Japanese. It is not an expansionist power or a threat to Australia any more than New Zealand is. Just because people look different or have different beliefs doesn’t make them threats, that’s a primitive form of thinking that humanity ought to move away from.

Beyond the population and proximity, I'm not characterising anything. You're reading in a lot into my comment.

But in Australian politics, Indonesia as a potential, albeit very unlikely, threat has been discussed, with the point being that 275 million people in a somewhat politically unstable country has that potential.

It's only in this century that Indonesia has become a functioning democracy and has had authoritarian and sometimes brutal leaders, slaughtering hundreds of thousands, in the not so distant past. It currently has relatively good relations with Australia but they are not close or secure. No one is accusing them of anything but there is a non-zero chance of them becoming a threat.

From 1980s-2010s, AU military training opfor was the "Musorian Armed Forces" aka Indonesia. ID recent military presentation on ballistic missiles also highlighted AU as potential target (and Singpore, Philiphines, SCS). Reality is ID defense will modernize with time threat perception is correlated to capabilities.

From the US perspective, SE Asia's population demographics make economic access a key determinant of the future.

If China can credibly restrict shipping in the south of the South China sea, then that accrues substantial economic power in the coming decades.

Which is another way of saying that if Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines don't believe in the US's regional power projection, they'll allow China to do as it wants.

In any escalation scenario, Guam gets plastered. Taiwan is blockaded. Okinawa is... well, that's a wildcard.

But Australia has land. A LOT of land. So establishing closer military ties (also with the Philippines) affords freedom of dispersement.

Which in turn increases US retaliatory options in the case of escalation.

Which makes sudden escalation less likely, as China has less to gain from it.

Or, in other words, the Pacific is now Europe ~1960, with the US trying to establish a credible capability to surge into the region in the event of hostilities.

Any power on the Pacific is going to lick its chops at the natural resources it could exploit if it just has this barely populated continent. So the Japanese during WW II and the Chinese today. Another area in similar distress is Siberia but they do have the protection of a nuclear armed bear.

> the Japanese during WW II

"Japan never seriously intended to invade Australia, a fact known to the Australian Government by mid-1942 and confirmed by intelligence reports, principal historian to the Australian War Memorial, Peter Stanley, said yesterday at a conference examining the events of 1942."

https://www.theage.com.au/national/japanese-invasion-a-myth-...

That's not entirely correct. There was a debate among the Navy and Army about whether they should or not or whether isolation was a better option. In the end they opted for isolation because due to Australia's geography (vast unpopulated). There is little doubt that if Japan had succeeded in the Pacific War that they would have gone after Australia (and Indonesia). It would be silly to write them off. The entire war was predicated over control of natural resources for an imagined future Empire.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposed_Japanese_invasion_of_...

> cannot confront the US when differences between us arise

While it's true that Australia is a minnow compared to the US, it doesn't mean that it can't influence the US, it just means it can't coerce it, which no one can anyway.

Australia has done well so far by being a "middle power" and using diplomacy and statecraft. That's where its future lies. Everyone has to deal with the enormous power of the US, it's much better to do it as a "good friend".

If it's any consolation, I believe Five Eyes access puts a nation above any old NATO member in adjacency to US hegemony and will become even more of a geopolitical asset in coming decades.

But yeah any amount of reading about the CIA in Aus, especially 1975 stuff, makes the power relationship clear.

I think John Mearsheimer summed it up quite well. Australia doesn't really have a choice. They don't really know what will happen if they go against China, but there are a lot of precedents on what happens to countries that go against the US. I guess the general consensus is to not risk that.

The Aukus deal is completely crazy. Australia is paying the US to build their own shipyards in the hopes that they get the right to share OLD submarines with the UK.

> “Now some people say there’s an alternative: you can go with China,” said Mearsheimer. “You have a choice here: you can go with China rather the United States. There’s two things I’ll say about that. Number one, if you go with China, you want to understand you are our enemy. You are then deciding to become an enemy of the United States. Because again, we’re talking about an intense security competition.”

> “You’re either with us or against us,” he continued. “And if you’re trading extensively with China, and you’re friendly with China, you’re undermining the United States in this security competition. You’re feeding the beast, from our perspective. And that is not going to make us happy. And when we are not happy you do not want to underestimate how nasty we can be. Just ask Fidel Castro.”

https://caitlinjohnstone.com/2023/03/14/on-war-with-china-au...

Australia exports a huge amount of iron ore and coal [0]. Out of all Australian exports, about 1/3 go to China. I'd assume even higher for the bulk materials.

Australia has a lot of the world's iron ore deposits [1]. Russia and Brazil are the other options, but each with about half Australia's size. And China with half Russia and Brazil's size.

China needs steel. Which means China needs iron ore. Which means China needs Australia / Russia / Brazil.

Which means if Australia avoids overtly antagonizing China, they'll most likely look the other way to avoid disrupting supply.

What would upset Australia's power is a breakdown of freedom of navigation by commercial shipping in the Pacific.

Historically, the US has been supportive of this. China is much less inclined to do so, absent benefit to itself.

Cue AUKUS opportunity. Principly focused on the type of assets that would allow Australia to credibly make sea denial costly for China.

> Australia is paying the US to build their own shipyards in the hopes that they get the right to share OLD submarines with the UK.

Australia gets US and UK nuclear submarine technology.

And 3 new-build US Virginia-class attack submarines, with an option for a further 2.

And help updating their port facilities to enable servicing nuclear submarines, which potentially means additional US SSN/SSBN visits.

In addition to closer cooperation on drone and other programs.

If Australia can keep China unhappy, but shy of angry, it's a good deal for Australia.

[0] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_exports_of_Australia

[1] https://www.statista.com/statistics/267381/world-reserves-of...

PRC is MORE supportive of commercial shipping since most of shipping goes to PRC, not unconstrained military FONAP under guise of civilian maritime research. Historically US has seized/disrupted much more merchant shipping than PRC because US likes their sanctions against adversaries.

AUKUS subs to disrupt PRC shipping is highly questionable, not least because there's only a few of them, and they won't be available for 30+ years if ever, by which time PRC subsurface will dramatically out number them, not to mention their survivability / detectability against PRC ASW / subsurface detector infra. The tactic / strategic value of the subs are questionable on short/medium/long term timelines. The real and immediate value of AUKUS was forward positioning more US assets in west AU (bombers / subs), which announement also happened essentially concurrently with AUKUS announcement. The complexities of the nuke boats, not the subs themselves, is the glue that politically bind AU with said US posture for decades. The subs themselves, IMO will do little in terms of force balance/deterrance in 30+ years, or half that considering how much long range strikes PRC will be building to make west AU and most of US infra in AU unsurvivable.

The PRC has only had a blue water navy in the last couple decades.

We see what their first impulse to do with that is in the militarization and claiming of the South China Sea.

We'll see what their use of naval power is in the next few decades.

If you're betting on "Use it to enforce rules based international order," then I'll gladly take the "Politics by other means" opposite side of that bet.

Do you believe if given a credible naval force that could rival the US Navy, China wouldn't blockade Taiwan tomorrow?

> AUKUS subs to disrupt PRC shipping is highly questionable

That wasn't my suggestion. It was AUKUS subs to deter interdiction and threatening of commercial shipping by PRC naval forces, in support of PRC political goals.

PRC has had a blue enough water navy to reach SCS since the 60s - it's their backyard not the gulf of Aden. See Paracel island skirmish in 74 and Johnson Reef in 88 against Vietnam. Obviously not enough to deter the USN but the US was neutral on the SCS dispute until recently for obvious geopolitical reasons. Latest round of SCS drama and reclamation around the 2010s also started by Vietnam who spurred every other claimant to improve features, including PRC who btw was second last to reclaim and militarize out of 6 claimants. Brunei is good boi. TLDR is PRC impulse will obviously use the navy (really coastguard/scs militia) to assert sovereignty rights (as do other claimants) but has not actually interrupted commercial shipping despite having decades to counter the narrative. Even when PRC had good reason to i.e. ROC/TW attempted to blockade PRC via port closure policy until the 90s. Entire narrative PRC will disrupt SCS SLOCs is fabricated by the US to rationalize increased naval/coast guard presence in SCS considering shipping could be routed around SCS - study in the 00s pegged rerouting premium at 10% to circumvent SCS, basically trivial.

Yes, PRC disrupting commercial shipping is a valid strategic concern but the hypotheticals of it don't actually make much sense given where force balance is heading. PRC trend towards mainland based long range fires = PRC doesn't need navy to blockade TW (and increasingly US assets in 1st island chain including SCS). Real work is credibly deterring the US from intervening at all by expanding strikes to disrupting 2/3IC and even AU/CONUS. I think people, especially those brought up in the US military talking points, fixate too hard over the naval component in IndoPac for both sides but signs are pointing to increasing irrelevance of naval projection - large reason for B21 and NGAD and trying to get JP/PH/AU to expand basing is to plug loss of fires from diminishing role of naval power which US says is important to rectify while inaction to reform US ship building and acquisitions suggest it's not. They see which way the next potential war is heading.

Ultimately what makes more sense is the threat narrative of PRC disrupting SCS shipping is useful to rationalize US forward deployment just like AUKUS subs are about getting US bombers in west AU. Which circles back to AUKUS subs, the consensus criticism is deterrence value for a few nuke boats is minimal especially in 30 years it will take to get subs online and especially in SCS which is borderline PRC lake at this point given state trend of PRC ASW and subsea monitoring expansion. That's without mentioning PRC's own nuke sub procurement that will reach if not exceed parity of US+AUKUS with post reveal that initial batch of AUKUS subs will be redirecting hulls from USN. Criticism of AUKUS subs deterrence value is explicitly about how little deterrence it offers relative to cost and how it will bind AU defense to US interests and erode long term AU sovereignty. The latter being the primary strategic logic of AUKUS.

I think you're underselling your country. Australia is big and important enough that the US can't just ignore it or casually overthrow its government and install a puppet one.

Obviously, it would benefit Australia to keep a good relationship with the US, but that doesn't mean they have to acquiesce to every American demand. What is the US going to do? Find another Australia?

There are many countries that don't share much of the nebulous "values" with America yet enjoy a membership of US-led military alliances, because they're important enough. (Might not be a great example, but see Turkey.)