No; for example, as discussed, retirees are in the set. If supply of labor falls, a greater proportion of people able to be retired will work due to economic incentives.
> I understand, but aggregate production will go down, would it not?
Yes, but it contradicts your "10% less".
Fighting the 10% less is:
- For each worker, their least productive hours will be cut rather than their most productive
- For some of hours lost, additional workers will be employed in higher value jobs.
- Some types of output will not be affected at all; others it will be worth paying overtime.
- For some of hours lost, automation will be employed.
- Lowering commute use of roads and transport will increase productivity.
All in all, I'd guess lowering the work week by 10%, and the nominal days-per-week to 4, might lower aggregate output by a couple percent. I would also expect wages to increase, arresting trends where wages have stagnated as productivity has increased.
This is only possible with generous social benefits given to those who aren't working. In the top 8 most generous states, transfer payments given to those not working exceed the median income[0].
> it's not corrected for demographic (aging) effects
You're right. The prime working-age group (25-54) reversed the same downward trend after the 90-00 peak sometime in 2015, and recovered relatively quickly post-Covid[1]. But the picture isn't as rosy for young (20-24) entrants to the employment marketplace[2], which is worrisome.
> The marginal benefit of the factor (e.g. per-hour productivity) tends to go up, too
I understand, but aggregate production will go down, would it not?
[0]: https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/the_work_...
[1]: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LNS11300060
[2]: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LNS11300036