Which part exactly?
Hahahahaha... seriously, where? What does make it seem that way? This is few hours worth of effort. That damn indicator took the longest to draw. Here, have a look at runner-ups - http://drbl.in/dpbA, http://drbl.in/dpgl
You're absolutely right. That's a far clearer explanation of what's happening here. A standard login form is rate limited to protect from brute force attempts, when calling a url for each character entered, this is problematic. I think the value in his approach is that it makes it significantly harder to brute force the password.
This is exactly what it does. See this comment for details - http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3689051
All you're doing is shifting the time at which you check the password, from when the form is submitted, to when each key is pressed.
You seem to be wanting to assume that a correlation between some subset of the input bits leads to a correlation between some subset of the hash bits. But that's exactly what a cryptographic hash function is designed to prevent.
EDIT: The brute-forcing issue assumes that you treat form submissions and keypresses differently. In other words, why would you ignore a billion mismatches on keypresses and then raise an alarm on a few failed form submissions? You're just dividing the detection into two different phases, for no real purpose.
EDIT: I'm surprised more people aren't commenting on this. It should be clear that if there were any way to tell if a match were "close", that would totally defeat the purpose of a cryptographic hash.
Essentially all this does it check the password (well, with extra meaningless false positives) without you having to press return.