Re:Remote Code Execution in OpenSSH’s forwarded SSH-agent
by lxgr on Wednesday July 19, 2023 @07:21PM
(#36794909)
> Is it possible to configure SSH agent forwarding to only forward some specific private keys?
Not sure about that, but you can configure it so that it asks you for confirmation before every private key usage, so I suspect you could script a solution around that confirmation mechanism?
> Although I guess that wouldn't protect you from the root problem of a vulnerable OpenSSH client.
Yes – in the end, your SSH client, the terminal emulator it's running in etc. are ultimately software too that could be remotely exploited.
I think in this particular case, there was a certain mismatch of threat expectations between the attack surfaces of ssh (the client, exposed to lots of potentially malicious input) and ssh-agent (mostly accepting input from semi-trusted processes on the same host – except for agent forwarding, of course).
Not sure about that, but you can configure it so that it asks you for confirmation before every private key usage, so I suspect you could script a solution around that confirmation mechanism?
> Although I guess that wouldn't protect you from the root problem of a vulnerable OpenSSH client.
Yes – in the end, your SSH client, the terminal emulator it's running in etc. are ultimately software too that could be remotely exploited.
I think in this particular case, there was a certain mismatch of threat expectations between the attack surfaces of ssh (the client, exposed to lots of potentially malicious input) and ssh-agent (mostly accepting input from semi-trusted processes on the same host – except for agent forwarding, of course).