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Re:Remote Code Execution in OpenSSH’s forwarded SSH-agent by Arnavion on Wednesday July 19, 2023 @06:41PM (#36794503)
>Agent forwarding forwards the keys insecurely. If you can launch an agent-forwarded connection, then the HSM is already irrelevant.

No? ssh-agent works fine with keys that are not exportable from the HSM. By the very definition it's not possible for anything to export the key, ssh-agent or otherwise.

>yes, but messing up your terminal is not an RCE

It has been, and can be again.

https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/dont...

Re:Remote Code Execution in OpenSSH’s forwarded SSH-agent by iudqnolq on Thursday July 20, 2023 @01:30AM (#36797163)
That's not an RCE, it's a DoS.

As the article describes most Windows terminal emulators just call SetWindowText when they get the set window title escape code. For some reason Windows implements that function very inefficiently so if it ends up being called in a tight loop your computer can freeze.

Re:Remote Code Execution in OpenSSH’s forwarded SSH-agent by Arnavion on Thursday July 20, 2023 @11:22AM (#36801851)
Read carefully.

>I was searching for a bug in ANSI characters that respond to a change of the window’s title. One of the things I did was check how the previous bugs were exploited. One of them, CVE-2015-8971 (found by Nicolas Braud-Santoni), was a bug in Terminology 0.7.0 that didn’t filter new line (\n) escape character when changing the window title. It allowed you to modify the window title and then re-insert it into the terminal’s input buffer, resulting in arbitrary terminal input, which then caused code execution.

Re:Remote Code Execution in OpenSSH’s forwarded SSH-agent by gunapologist99 on Thursday July 20, 2023 @12:37PM (#36803071)
Vulnerability in your terminal app, not in SSH, but point taken, there is always that possibility.