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Re:Remote Code Execution in OpenSSH’s forwarded SSH-agent by justsomeadvice0 on Wednesday July 19, 2023 @04:01PM (#36792352)
Lots of people end up with AgentForward on by default as a sort of "make it work" fix, and lots of people use `git+ssh` on untrusted servers. Here's an example:

https://abyssdomain.expert/@filippo/109659699817863532

TBF this is a vulnerable config either way; but RCE on the client shouldn't be possible.

Re:Remote Code Execution in OpenSSH’s forwarded SSH-agent by tinus_hn on Wednesday July 19, 2023 @04:21PM (#36792640)
I’m not so sure git is secure against a malicious server, even if you’re not simply pulling in a Makefile written by the attacker.
Re:Remote Code Execution in OpenSSH’s forwarded SSH-agent by themoonisachees on Thursday July 20, 2023 @05:25AM (#36798396)
Assuming you do perfect integrity checks of the git repo you're pulling, git uses SSH and obeys ssh config for each hosts under the hood. It's safe to say that if you have forward-agent enabled git is vulnerable.
Re:Remote Code Execution in OpenSSH’s forwarded SSH-agent by doubled112 on Wednesday July 19, 2023 @08:32PM (#36795479)
I've been using a separate SSH config for git for a long time now. Nice to see it wasn't just paranoia.

Among the settings are explicitly disabling agent forwarding, and using a git specific identity (SSH key).