But yes, URLs should have been structured. We already see paths rendered with breadcrumbs, the protocol replaced with an icon, `www` auto-inserted and omitted, and the domain highlighted. If that's not a structure, I don't know what is.
By cramming everything into the same string, we open ourselves to phishing attacks by domains like `www.google.com.evil.com`, malicious traversal, 404s from mangled relative paths, and much more.
I don't see how you can get away from having a defined serialisation format. People try to operate directly on the serialised data using ad-hoc implementations and run into trouble.
But I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "should have been structured". Eventually you've gotta define the bytes if you want to interoperate with other software.
Yep, that's exactly it. Your TLS certificate is not sent as string, and neither are your TCP packets, nor the images contained in them. Your URLs shouldn't be either, but it's probably too late for that.
> People try to operate directly on the serialised data using ad-hoc implementations and run into trouble.
That's a whole lot better than the current footgun we have, where
http://http://http://@http://http://?http://#http://
is a valid URL. People don't operate directly on string URLs without trouble either, so at least the structured data is not inviting incorrect usage.That is, it is easy to see that the reason we have URLs sent as strings, is that we collect them from the user. And it makes perfect sense that we would collect strings of characters from users.
And in those rare cases, of course you can collect strings from the user. But then they have to be parsed, and that's what should be on the wire. IP addresses are also sometimes entered by hand, but we don't send those strings in TCP packets.
> Yep, that's exactly it. Your TLS certificate is not sent as string, and neither are your TCP packets, nor the images contained in them.
...all of those things mentioned have defined serialization. i expect all of them have had security issues because of problems with deserialization code.
What is your point? That strings don't need defined formats? That they have less security issues?
Two visually identical file names may map to different files (because confusables[1]), or two different names map to the same file (because normalization[2]), or the ".jpg" at the end may not actually be the extension (because right-to-left override[3]),
Those are all because of Unicode, which is an even worse idea in general.
> it's just that for some reason (like basic arithmetic) people don't seem to be taught enough about it to understand.
That's the same argument used to defend manual memory management. But education is not enough. Escaping is something you have to remember to do every time*, or it'll blow up spectacularly. Even knowledgeable professionals mess it up, or it wouldn't occupy 6 of the 25 spots in this list.
> Those are all because of Unicode, which is an even worse idea in general.
What's the alternative? Japanese speakers writing file names in ASCII? Unicode is a modern marvel, it's our fault we use it where it doesn't belong.
* Not necessarily every input/output, but at least every system that interacts with it.
We make it look like it is a request response with a chat bot, but it is more realistic to say we are making a single document and having the model fill out the rest. That is, there is no out of band. There is only the document.
- Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') (#2)
- Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') (#3)
- Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') (#4)
- Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') (#8)
- Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') (#16)
- Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') (#23)
All of these came from a systems designer trying to avoid structured data, and instead (mis)using strings by treating certain characters as special. And it's crazy how many times this mistake has been repeated: file paths, URLs, log files, CSV, HTML, HTTP (cookies, headers, query strings), domain names, SQL, shell commands, shell pipelines... One unescaped character and it all blows up.
One could say "at least it's human-readable", but that's not reliable either. Take files names, for example. Two visually identical file names may map to different files (because confusables[1]), or two different names map to the same file (because normalization[2]), or the ".jpg" at the end may not actually be the extension (because right-to-left override[3]), not to mention names with newlines or backspaces in them, and inconsistencies between operating systems. All to avoid using a proper list!
So the computer interpretation of a string might be wrong because a special character sneaked in; and the human interpretation might be wrong because text is complicated. Why the heck do we use it for infrastructure then?
For the sake of the next generations, I hope we leave strings for human text and nothing more.
[1] https://unicode.org/cldr/utility/confusables.jsp
[2] https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/qa/qa1173/_index...
[3] https://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/09/right-to-left-override-a...