> it would actually be worse bullshit to claim that the “random number generator” generates cryptographically random-enough source material that your password can’t be cracked.

We are in agreement.

I would argue the threat model of cracking a psuedorandom string of 16 characters would probably want to start with a copy of the rng implementation used, but still the question remains what is the least “bullshit” way to respond?

You seem to want critical guidance, a la “INTERCAL as your choice of language may make your code vulnerable”, but INTERCAL was the ask.

That’s what the author wanted, and the author left out any explanation for the generator’s intended use, or cryptographic requirements.

Rather than appear to be advocating for using this INTERCAL “password generator” for any real world use, my point was that I think the solution the author produced should be a capability of these models.

For sake of clarity, it is my opinion that if you want cryptographic security you should use libsodium, but if you want to watch these models flounder use an adhoc rng implemented in INTERCAL.

What prevents it from being cryptographically secure? The type/quality of the random numbers will depend on what the INTERCAL implementation uses to choose whether a line will execute according to the probability selected with "%". I don't see how that couldn't trivially be done with a cryptographically secure rng. To know whether it is or not you'd have to look at the compiler implementation.