While this is not a universally useful property, it can be valuable in situations where even being able to detect a device is using a particular protocol is a problem. A good example is using an anonymization network like Tor in a repressive country like China. Even if your data is protected by Tor, you probably don't want the authorities to know you're using Tor at all.
As you said, one of the biggest problems with this is that even if the protocol itself is perfect, it's not worth much if the network participants are known and communicating with them is itself evidence you're using the protocol. The solution to that would either be making the participants non-public and hard to discover (so an observer doesn't know you're talking to a network participant) or having participants do a lot of things other than participate in the network you're trying to hide. Tor for example takes the former approach with non-advertised "bridges" that you have to know about via some out of band method (e.g. someone emails one to you).
In practice, this indistinguishably property is becoming less useful even when it works given the ubiquity of "normal" encrypted protocols like SSL/TLS. Arguably just using TLS is far better than trying to look like random noise even if you're trying to hide, since random noise on a network is much less common than TLS and probably more of a red flag these days.
The tricky thing about baking TLS in at the protocol level is that it brings its baggage with it. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but it makes the design more complex to reason about. In particular, it is arguably overkill when you're not planning on using certificates, as is the case here. Just compare the number of steps here: https://tls13.xargs.org/ to any of the patterns here: http://www.noiseprotocol.org/noise.html#interactive-handshak...
Another thing worth mentioning regarding indistinguishability from randomness is the impact of metadata. Even if the bytes you send on the wire look meaningless, there's still the size of the message, the spacing between messages, the time of day, etc. Any of these channels can carry signal, and it is very hard, if not impossible, to get rid of those signals completely.
That said, I still think the original goal of indistinguishability is worthwhile, because if you can force the passive adversary to move from perfectly accurate methods (e.g. fingerprinting message contents) to imperfect ones (e.g. guessing the protocol from message timing), that seems like a win to me.
Even a protocol like Wireguard for example, which does hardcode protocol parameters and requires the client to know the server's public key in advance, is not designed to be indistinguishable from random noise. You can certainly do it, but you lose a lot of other properties that are arguably more important to protocol design than indistinguishably.