The team is digging into why the risk score is low. In general, the types of signals you describe weigh pretty heavily in Radar’s risk assessment, and should result in higher risk scores. In this particular attack, fraudulent actors are using some pretty sophisticated scripts to try and obtain lower risk scores. We’re iterating quickly to address and stop these types of attacks and score them correctly going forward.
Stripe will not eat the fees for card testing.
Also, it is mentioned in the thread they are using Stripe Checkout (we are too)
We're not using any other API from Stripe other than that required to launch the hosted Checkout page.
Contacting Stripe about this (this was about 2 years ago) -- apparently this was all my fault -- despite CashApp "bank" accounts being bastions of fraud, and the credit card transactions all being from a single IP address. And I was given the run around since it wasn't my bank account used for the EFTs, so I didn't have a "fraud" claim and the stolen credit cards weren't mine either. But I was left holding the bag. Stripe took the negative balance out of my bank account.
Basically fraud is my problem even though their systems enabled it (for real, a simple check of an account routing number shows that it's the holding bank for CashApp, yet they allowed the EFTs without even the most cursory hold) -- but Stripe for years had no problem getting my more than 3% in credit card fees. Also the transaction size was far different than the typical transaction size that occurred for multiple years. But yeah, I get it, it's all my fault.
I contacted law enforcement with extremely detailed logs, even the geographic area where the transactions happened (down to the block of a neighborhood in Florida.) I contacted Stripe, I contacted CashApp. And nobody gave a shit because it wasn't their money.
If Stripe were on the hook for the fraud, I'd bet their systems would get really good in a hurry. As it is they not only didn't have any liability, they also made money from me on the chargeback fees. And CashApp doesn't care because it isn't their money either.
I'm working on a new startup project now and Stripe is not on my list of payment processors. I will never use anything Square-related ever again either. I realize that the others probably aren't any better, but that there was no empathy (and for weeks after, attempted fraud with Cash App banks accounts continued to be attempted, but I had manually blocked transfers to that specific routing number in my application code -- so I saw the fraud attempts continue long after.)
Basically Stripe facilitated money laundering and then left you on the hook for it while happily taking fees from you
I think of these "online wallet" services as effectively "VPNs for money": they give a fraudster who wants to get around some other form of blacklisting, as many additional credit card numbers to spread their tx volume across as they like — all with arbitrary credentials (because these cards are issued by "online banks" who never see their customers in person, so it's very easy to register accounts with purchased false identities. And people also just resell them: https://wmcentre.net/en/item/papara-vasha-turetskaya-zarubez...)
If I can block Tor IP addresses in Cloudflare, why can't I block these "money VPNs" in Stripe?
I'm not saying that fraud is an easy problem to solve, but I think you're absolutely right that this is a case of misaligned incentives. If it were Stripe's liability, it would get solved for _everyone_, rather than being in this middle ground where if you're lucky you might get help if you post on HN
What's the incentive for them to give you an accurate score if they make money anyway?
Contacting Stripe back then was a complete waste of time.
We implemented a bunch of rules manually which mostly fixed the issue and I reached out to support to ask if there was anything else we should do.
A few days later they said we need to "take immediate action" and offered only generic advice.
I told them what we already did (implementing the Radar rules manually) and they said oh yeah seems fine, looks like it stopped. But the kicker is we did that before they reviewed our account and told us we needed to take action. What a joke.
This was after spending tens of thousands in fees in a single month with them.
The only reason some of these payments went through this week is because of the ridiculously low Risk Score that Stripe assigned some of the payments so our rules weren't triggered (why worry about a transaction if Stripe gave it a 0 out of 100 risk score?)
I really want to know how Stripe can assign a ZERO risk score to a customer using a card from a different country from the IP, with the wrong country in the billing address, with no CVC pass, and with a lot of related failed payments from different cards associated with the same IP/email. Madness.