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A comment on Kaspersky: Case study: fake hardware cryptowallet (Trezor). Parent comment

Re:Kaspersky: Case study: fake hardware cryptowallet (Trezor) by bibaheu on Monday May 15, 2023 @06:46PM (#35955537)
You can generate the coin movement operation in the air gapped machine, write it down on paper, and then use a normal, connected computer to transmit it to the network. The private key never left the air gapped machine, with this method.
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Re:Kaspersky: Case study: fake hardware cryptowallet (Trezor) by Scoundreller on Monday May 15, 2023 @06:48PM (#35955560)
The method I’ve read about is to print “the request” onto a QR code, have the air-gapped machine scan it, sign it and print off the signed transaction QR to be scanned into the networked computer to propagate to the network.

A bit more to trust but a lot less to type.

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Re:Kaspersky: Case study: fake hardware cryptowallet (Trezor) by polygamous_bat on Monday May 15, 2023 @07:46PM (#35956078)
And then you get hacked anyway because the QR code generator was compromised and switched around a few bytes before creating the QR code.
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Re:Kaspersky: Case study: fake hardware cryptowallet (Trezor) by Scoundreller on Monday May 15, 2023 @07:52PM (#35956131)
Ideally it’s a functionality of the wallet, but I think only bitcoin armory has this function.
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