Obviously, if unrelated people around the world are at random times coming up with the same (ostensibly) random gigantic prime factors, there is a randomness issue.
The point the paper makes is that this isn't necessarily a CSPRNG issue. The issue is not necessarily that people are using rand() to generate primes. It's that to generate factors for RSA, you need more than a CSPRNG: you need a prime number generator that correctly uses the CSPRNG. The paper hypothesizes one very plausible prime number generator that would be insecure even if driven off hardware entropy.
I've tried to do quick research and the method of generating random primes seems to have been added between FIPS 186-2 and FIPS 186-3. Since FIPS 186-3 only came out (approved not draft) in 2009 its probably, feel free to prove this extrapolation wrong, that these older key pairs could've been generated by an older toolkit, or in a time where this random prime generation recommendation was unknown. So once again we're bitten by these multi-year certificates.
Have they ruled out the cause as a buggy or backdoored key generator? Or running down the cause left for some future research?
My comment was in regards to crypto usage in general where the most problematic factor is the misuse of PRNG and seeds. (ECDSA PS3 for example).
edit: Article makes points towards a flaw in the CSPRNG and Prime generation.