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Re:The .zip TLD sucks and it needs to be immediately revoked by mholt on Friday May 12, 2023 @05:12PM (#35922477)
You can be on a legitimate, trusted web site or be reading a legit, trusted email from a contact and still have a link slip in there. Other commenters like xsmasher have described a benign example, I'll rephrase:

> I've attached familyphotos.zip -- here you go!

The email client will presumably have a link below called familyphotos.zip, but the email client ALSO link-ified the text familyphotos.zip to download the content at https://familyphotos.zip, which is untrusted but you don't realize it doesn't go to the same familyphotos.zip file.

Screenshot: https://twitter.com/mholt6/status/1657133439546695680

Re:The .zip TLD sucks and it needs to be immediately revoked by askiiart on Wednesday May 17, 2023 @03:35PM (#35980124)
hxxps:[//]]familyphotos.zip (broke the link on purpose) is already registered, and it downloads the zip file. 4 days later, and unsurprisingly, it's already happened. I'll open the zip in a VM and see what happens, it's 0.58 KB...

Update: Turns out it just contains what_happened.txt, a copy of which is below. Thanks anonymous person!

```

"Hey, this isn't family pictures!"

You're right -- and that link you clicked wasn't a file attached to the email or message you received.

Thanks to Google[0][1], now it's impossible to discern the difference between a link to an attachment called "familyphotos.zip" and a link to this file... unless you are able to inspect the destination of a link before clicking it. Most software and apps don't allow that, and most people don't know how to tell the difference anyway.

Have fun in the Wild Wild Web!

[0]: https://www.blog.google/products/registry/8-new-top-level-do... [1]: https://twitter.com/Google/status/1653866291692728320

```

Re:The .zip TLD sucks and it needs to be immediately revoked by reqrbHVPetKGE57 on Tuesday May 23, 2023 @04:37PM (#36050527)
Or the attacker could've just sent you ... a link to familyphotos.zip. I'm not sure why you're bringing client-side auto-vivification (which yes, is a bad idea) into the picture when the attacker could equally send a link. I'm also not sure why you assume that clients will begin to auto-vivify .zip links just as a result of it existing, nor why you assume that's any worse than them auto-vivifying https://example.com/familyphotos.zip.