I'm a full-disclosure guy at heart, but why would I want to advertise to the attacker my potential weaknesses?
Wouldn't I find my own personal selfish security is maximized when I falsify that field when generating my keys?
It depends if you're the type of user who would like to rely on hearing themselves that their keys are vulnerable because of the software used or if you're the type of user who would like to be informed by an automated script that their keys are vulnerable.
I am guessing there are many in the latter category and a few in the former category but at the same time most of the people who decide these things will live in the former.
As for you, marshray, personally, I'm going to go with yes. But does that really make things worse for those who opt in to the potential for notifications? I think you can make your security tradeoff and others can make theirs and both categories of users will end up happy.
To see if it could potentially be a afflicted version of a toolkit, a scatter plot of dates and frequencies of these shared primes would provide a little more information.
Maybe it's a good idea to tag a public key with the software/version used to create it. Debian fiasco keys are easy to pick out - the entropy was so low that the bad keys can be enumerated. This new attack relies on any small weakness in the distribution of primes, and it seems quite hard to track down responsible versions of software.
I wonder how many of these shared factors aren't the actual value of p or q chosen at generation time (primality tests are probabilistic).