Interested to explore how a cache poisoning attack might be easier on a Domain Verification protocol TXT record compared to a DNS-01 TXT record.
Given the scenario: an attacker is attempting to claim a domain (example.com) with service provider (SP1) who uses a DNS revolver (DR1) I don’t immediately see how the subdomain approach makes a cache poisoning attack easier.
Couldn’t the attacker similarly keep asking DR1 for <rand>._acme-challenge.example.com and spam back NS delegation answers for _acme-challenge.example.com, with the goal that upon cache poisoning success, they could fraudulently claim example.com with SP1?
I may have overlooked something here, if so please explain.
With either method, DNSSEC would definitely seem the solution as you’ve suggested.
I think a solution here in the validation space is just avoiding the caching server altogether. If the validating server does something like dig +trace, it avoids this problem, especially if it prefers TCP.
They're actually easier at the subdomain level, because you can keep asking for <rand>._dv.example.com to prevent cache hits, all the while spamming back NS delegation answers for _dv to the cache servers with a long TTL.
DNSSEC of course solves that, but a lot of people are going to roll their eyes at that solution and a lot of things don't support it.
Just curious.