Also, this was an implementation bug, not a WASM bug. WASM specifies an execution environment; what developers do in it is entirely up to them (and the vendors of the libraries they use).
Trust Wallet seems to have botched the latter [1] (in fact, it looks to me like they aren't even understanding the implications of that decision based on the PR description [2]). How is that WASMs fault?
[1] https://github.com/trustwallet/wallet-core/pull/2240
[2] They say that their choice of using the Mersenne Twister is "inspired by emscripten", which does no such thing.
It's perfectly possible to implement a secure PRNG in WASM and supply entropy/a seed as a parameter to that, and this is exactly what emscripten does. Trust just happened to provide a non-secure PRNG in their implementation (and ironically quotes emscripten's PR while doing the opposite).
They reimplemented low-level crypto primitives in an insecure way, and quite possibly without even realizing that they were doing so, and their users are paying the price. No language or framework can protect developers from that.