To fix the tracking issue, you'd need to employ strict limitations about what service can or cannot prompt for authentication when you're on a web page, and I'm sure restricting that stuff will break the few remaining big sites that rely on client certificates today.
Luckily, we have an alternative today. WebAuthn uses similar cryptographic principles to set up secure tokens and the UX is a lot better.
The only way I see out of this mess is for everyone to start replacing bearer tokens with signed requests. And possibly some extension to webauthn so the browser will use your webauthn creds to sign every requests using a standard signing protocol.
1. I care about the identity of the other station. This does require a full PKI (or something like it)
2. I don't care about the identity of the other station I just don't want some third-party rando listening in. This is the majority of my web traffic, personally: I don't trust ycombinator.com any more than I would trust someone pretending to be ycombinator.com, so the verification that they are ycombinator.com doesn't actually do anything. Just encrypt opportunistically, everywhere, and leave the PKI for situations where it actually matters (like, if I were applying to ycombinator or something).
It was just way ahead of its time and by now has regressed a bit from lack of interested parties. TLSv1.3 implementations made renegotiations to mTLS impossible for example, making for example a separate `/login` page not possible. It would be possible to improve the UX, if there'd be an interest. We already have passkeys/webauthn, client certificates aren't much more complex.
I also doubt it will go anywhere any time soon for those same reasons.