The threat model for every lambda user having a password manager does not cover breaking and entering[0]: they should write down their master password and keep it at home in their bedroom drawer.
Use biometrics where possible (e.g. bitwarden on Android has that option)
[0] maybe it does for you, working on some DoD-confidential docs, but your computer-illiterate aunt doesn't.
She lost it anyway. TWICE.
As for bio-metrics they are not possible on all devices, and some software will require you to enter the master password once in a while even if it's activated.
But even if it was not the case, if you loose your device, you need to setup the new one, and for that, you need the master password or have backups.
Back to square one.
If you are trying to prevent most attacks from the internet, this is perfectly fine.
If you are trying to prevent a close person to gain access to your whole system, this could be improved.
It's not ideal, but it's better than the alternative of them reusing extremely easy to guess passwords.
I introduced several times password managers to my friends and family, and more often than not, it was a disaster.
Because eventually, either they set a very simple master password they reused elsewhere, defeating the entire purpose of the whole exercise, or they lost the master password.
The latter meant they lost a lot of accesses (unless they have backup discipline, which of course they can't have by nature) because there is no recovery.
So the alternative was for me to hold the backup passwords or recovery passphrase/seed. So much for making them independent.
Bottom lines: security sucks and ergonomics sucks because most users are not tech saavy enough to handle complicated cases.
Making E2EE even an option is nice, and the best you can do for now.