Radically increasing the vesting time means that you would need to grant several times the number of options that you would need to grant for shorter vesting terms, just to maintain parity. The potential dilutive effect for other shareholders (including employees) would be rather large.
True, but with pay-for-performance hiring the wrong guy means you paid less (since he didn't perform).
Further, I don't know of a viable alternative. Don't pay for performance? Now you're dealing with a problem of adverse selection - you're more likely to land with a lemon.
The chief problem with CEO pay is that it exhibits much optionality without compensation to the shareholders for that - if the CEO does well he experiences a gain, if he doesn't, he just gets fired (unless the failure is fraudulent or very public).
The alleged problem is that the vesting/restriction periods for these stock and options is too short, like a few years. I have a pet idea that CEO pay should be mostly in stock that vests quickly but is restricted for a very long mean time, like 20 years. But that's just a pet idea and I bet it would be a very hard sell to potential CEOs.
I also think pay for performance is overrated. It won't help if you have the wrong guy in the first place.