Re:Sigstore protects Apt archives: apt-verify and apt-sigstore
by yencabulator on Tuesday April 18, 2023 @03:45PM
(#35619053)
Since they're linking to rekor and talking about Certificate Transparency, it's likely the general goal is what CT wants:
That the server cannot provide malicious response X to just the victim, while looking innocent to others. Certificate Transparency forces the signer to publish the fact that they sign something, leading to such attacks being noticeable, in the sense that "there was an extra thing signed and it's not the usual thing".
With TLS, the idea is that big corporations can tail the CT log and make sure there have been no extra certificates created for their domains.
(I can't vouch for whether this work achieves that goal. Something needs to check the inclusion proof in the client, before trusting the data. Auditors need to tail the CT log.)
That the server cannot provide malicious response X to just the victim, while looking innocent to others. Certificate Transparency forces the signer to publish the fact that they sign something, leading to such attacks being noticeable, in the sense that "there was an extra thing signed and it's not the usual thing".
With TLS, the idea is that big corporations can tail the CT log and make sure there have been no extra certificates created for their domains.
(I can't vouch for whether this work achieves that goal. Something needs to check the inclusion proof in the client, before trusting the data. Auditors need to tail the CT log.)