Surely all a "sufficiently motivated" attacker would need to do is peruse the unsound bugs on GitHub?
https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues?q=is%3Aopen+is%3Ais...
Those aren't considered to be security issues. Makes me wonder what the point of banning `unsafe` is at all. You're going to need some other system anyway...
> The "trusted" version of PL/Rust uses a unique fork of Rust's std entitled postgrestd when compiling LANGUAGE plrust user functions.
If you a) don't have access to unsafe, and b) don't have access to the stdlib that lets you do powerful things without unsafe, then you're very limited in what you can do.
https://smallcultfollowing.com/babysteps/blog/2016/10/02/obs... discusses this further. Conceptually, you can think of "entirely Safe Rust" to be a very limited language, which you then progressively add "capabilites" to by exposing safe interfaces implemented with unsafe code. For example, Vec and Box (which require unsafe) grant safe code the ability to do heap allocations.
It's true that this is not designed as a security boundary. As I note in my comment above, the PL/Rust devs also make that clear. That doesn't mean it has no value as part of a defence in depth strategy.
However, they make it clear that this is not intended to be your only defence against an attacker:
> Note that this is done on a best-effort basis, and does not provide a strong level of security — it's not a sandbox, and as such, it's likely that a skilled hostile attacker who is sufficiently motivated could find ways around it