Re:Theo de Raadt: Synthetic Memory Protections (CanSecWest 2...
by Alifatisk on Saturday March 25, 2023 @12:41PM
(#35304364)
This is a fascinating topic, are there any practical real life implementations of this?
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Re:Theo de Raadt: Synthetic Memory Protections (CanSecWest 2...
by mburee on Saturday March 25, 2023 @12:44PM
(#35304403)
OpenBSD?
Re:Theo de Raadt: Synthetic Memory Protections (CanSecWest 2...
by t-3 on Saturday March 25, 2023 @08:37PM
(#35309245)
It's worth noting that the new mitigations discussed in the talk are only available in -current. They'll be in the next release though (which should be coming in the next few months).
Re:Theo de Raadt: Synthetic Memory Protections (CanSecWest 2...
by tete on Monday March 27, 2023 @09:08AM
(#35326221)
April being the best guess currently, though end of likely, because May 1st is the usual goal. The best guess being April, because it's what the (non-finished) 7.3 page says for the month right now. Of course that's not a guarantee, but it makes it likely. Also a branch of 7.3 already exists.
Re:Theo de Raadt: Synthetic Memory Protections (CanSecWest 2...
by rsaxvc on Saturday March 25, 2023 @01:50PM
(#35305138)
This presentation is an overview of many different mitigations spanning ~27 years. Some are quite widely implemented. I'm less familiar with the newer stuff, but here's some I've run into.
No-exec stacks: some UNIX machines, tons of systems today.
w^x: win xp+, Linux, several RTOS, OpenBSD, lots of others
aslr: requires MMU. OpenBSD, contemporary Windows(but partially opt in?), Linux.
X-only: Arm has supported X-only for their embedded stuff for a while, and it's fairly lightweight, though you lose PC-relative loads.