No, and that's the point. I understand that banks mark long-term bonds as hold-to-maturity (and only then can list them at par on their balance sheet). Otherwise, they have to mark them to market, and _any sales_ of HTM bonds flip the entire tranche over to MTM.

So part of the problem is that SVB had a reasonable-looking balance sheet of HTM bonds, then had to sell some at market, which flipped their entire portfolio to MTM and destroyed their balance sheet.

To allow the bond sale before they had a cash infusion basically flushed the business. I wonder if board of directors had an understanding of how it would detonate the balance sheet. After that, the regulators took the obvious necessary action.

And people saw this is what they were doing and were tweeting about it in advance of all their “problems”.

Sure, though in all fairness, I understand it's standard GAAP accounting for all banks, and your balance sheet has to have a footnote explaining the market value as well. I.e., this particular play or accounting standard is extremely common.

It seems like SVB was perhaps a little more exposed to interest rate risk than others, and had a pool of depositors that were more likely to withdraw significant funds in lockstep.

I guess that's what you normally do when you're overweighted that asset class and you must cover withdrawals!