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Re:Observations from two weeks of SSH brute force attacks by peterwwillis on Thursday January 26, 2012 @10:56AM (#3514564)
A long time ago I used to have a general purpose server on a DSL line with port 22 open. I thought everything was fairly secure, patched up, etc... I never thought brute forcers would be able to guess one of my accounts (which was a friend's account actually). The kicker? The password was the username. I found out about the rootkit a few days after they got in. I tell ya, kids these days just don't know how to hide a backdoor.

A really good port knocker is your best defense against rogue attackers of an external service (because there is no defense against a 0-day). For an iptables-supported system I recommend Knockknock by Moxie Marlinspike (http://www.thoughtcrime.org/software/knockknock/).

Re:Observations from two weeks of SSH brute force attacks by lloeki on Thursday January 26, 2012 @12:37PM (#3515048)
For brute forcing, without resorting to port knocking, fail2ban works well and has a pluggable system to handle more than ssh.
Re:Observations from two weeks of SSH brute force attacks by rlvesco7 on Thursday January 26, 2012 @04:26PM (#3516074)
Does fail2ban work against brute force distributed attacks?

I've noticed a few attacks that seem to be orchestrated from the same people but using different IPs.

Re:Observations from two weeks of SSH brute force attacks by nuclear_eclipse on Thursday January 26, 2012 @04:33PM (#3516094)
It doesn't specifically target distributed attacks, but I'm not really sure how something like that could know whether incoming requests are part of a botnet or ligitimate logins.
Re:Observations from two weeks of SSH brute force attacks by acdha on Friday January 27, 2012 @09:45AM (#3518410)
Or use only public-key authentication. I've run many internet-exposed servers for years without problems or kludgy obscurity measures like port knocking simply by disabling all forms of password authentication. This is faster, easier and has the advantages of not requiring non-standard client software, being observable by an attacker on the same network, and avoids the sort of rote password entry which causes mistakes and discourages long, complex passwords.
Re:Observations from two weeks of SSH brute force attacks by Nick_C on Friday January 27, 2012 @10:46PM (#3521251)
With public key only authentication, how does a user get their public key on to the server in the first place?

I ask because I have two servers, one I am a client at DreamHost and I can't configure their sshd daemon, the second is my own VPS where I am root.

Re:Observations from two weeks of SSH brute force attacks by acdha on Saturday January 28, 2012 @08:08PM (#3524029)
You only need the ability to write to a file in your home directory. In the case of a VPS you could do that before editing the sshd config (in large environments this is trivially automated as part of your install process, which is why e.g. Ubuntu EC2 images ship with public-key-only SSH by default).

In the case of a shared server you can't disable password auth, which is a powerful argument for using a unique password since that system is far more likely to be compromised.