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Re:Ask HN: Is Freewill a Requirement of Consciousness? by ted_bunny on Monday March 13, 2023 @08:00AM (#35134474)
Hard to paramtereize a relationship when we can't confidently define either member of it.

Personally, I think it's utterly silly to think that free will fits into a material model. If it's real, I'd sooner believe in a panpsychist universe than a magical meat computer that shifts reality at will. The Quantum Indeterminacy argument is God in the Gaps.

Re:Ask HN: Is Freewill a Requirement of Consciousness? by JoshCole on Monday March 13, 2023 @03:53PM (#35141500)
> I think it's utterly silly to think that free will fits into a material model.

It isn't silly, but it is hard to discuss it with people because logic breaks down under self-reference and logical debate has been the most popular mode of our debates since Aristotle. Even empiricism doesn't save from this weakness, because it implies we ought to update based on the observed evidence. The Halting Problem and the Incompleteness Theorems are very important to recognize. They lead to a recognition of the infinite self-reference that occurs quite naturally as physics reaches its limit and is employed to model an agent which uses that model to model another agent that is modeling them. This produces computationally irreducible phenomenon. From there we start to reach into game theoretic concerns wherein evidence denial on the basis of equilibrium consideration becomes normal. When extended to imperfect information settings we end up discovering that non-deterministic policies are optimal. This optimality proof and the guarantee of the ability to confound through undecidability give us a grip on what selection and variation ought to select for through an appeal to the central limit theorem.

The funniest thing to me is that the decision to deny this corresponds with choosing an unfactored and unsimplified representation for reality as being more correct. Yet this backfires in the most beautiful way: it is slower to compute then the factored and simpler representation. Which means it is computationally reducible. Which means other agents can know your output before you do. Which makes you victim to Halting Problem attacks - or rather it makes you determined but your world indeterminable for you. But the even more amusing irony is that the entire reason we even use logic and empiricism is because we recognize the proxy relationship advantage as a function of the proxy not being the actual thing. So it is a self-refuting position, because it tries to reject the underlying motive for both the use of logic and the use of evidence. Which, well, when you see it - now that is rather silly!

This might help to wrap your mind around the subject: https://www.wolframscience.com/nks/p750--the-phenomenon-of-f...

Re:Ask HN: Is Freewill a Requirement of Consciousness? by ted_bunny on Wednesday March 15, 2023 @11:21AM (#35169696)
Care to dumb this down? I have no clue what you're trying to say here.
Re:Ask HN: Is Freewill a Requirement of Consciousness? by JoshCole on Wednesday March 15, 2023 @12:51PM (#35171125)
For some calculations you can make them simpler and do them faster, but for other calculations you can't. When two things that try to predict things by making things simpler apply themselves to predicting each other they find that it is a situation wherein they can't do this. So we get into problems of imperfect information. So ask yourself: would you play rock every time were you to play rock paper scissors? Or would you prefer to take advantage of infinite recursion such that your opponent, even if they know all the deterministic rules you are subject to, cannot predict what you will do before you do it?
Re:Ask HN: Is Freewill a Requirement of Consciousness? by JoshCole on Friday March 17, 2023 @05:24PM (#35203105)
Another attempt at dumbing it down:

We sometimes don't know what will happen until it does. The best we can do is to make a guess. Sometimes this guess will be very often good, but it is still a guess and we need to be open to the idea that our guess was wrong in some aspects.

Suppose we could have a perfect guess though.

We can use the guess to figure out what would happen and it would always work. Okay, lets use it to determine what happens in the future in which we use it to determine what happens. Do you see the issue here? The guess references itself. So it can't predict the future in advance of it. There comes a point where it is looping and giving you the leading edge of what is knowable given the amount of time that has passed so far.

So we don't have the perfect guess, even when we have the perfect guess. We don't know what will happen before it happens, even if we know the rules that tell us what happens before they happen.

There are a bunch of wierd things that get implied by the math that is consequent to this, especially when you get into transpositional structures, but it isn't silly so much as it is non-sensory.

I mean, it does sound laughable. When Feynman said we guess when we do science and then validate the guesses with experiments people did laugh. Yet this is not because it is silly. It is because the non-sensory cases we can't differentiate from can only be differentiated from the sensory cases via the experiment.

What often happens though is that directly after the moment people pretend that it was all known before hand. It is a tricky moment, the present.