Re:Comcast Explains Why NASA's Web Site Was Blocked Last Wee...
by tptacek on Wednesday January 25, 2012 @03:08PM
(#3511481)
No, a single feature that exploits DNSSEC validation is part of Chrome.
Securing DNS with "end-to-end authenticity for DNS data" is like securing the web by signing every individual web page.
Re:Comcast Explains Why NASA's Web Site Was Blocked Last Wee...
by danyork on Wednesday January 25, 2012 @03:40PM
(#3511630)
Plugins/extensions are available now for both Chrome and Firefox that provide a visual indicator in the address bar:
http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/resources/how-to-ad...
http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/resources/how-to-ad...
But, to your point, these are not built-in and require a user to actually install the extensions. And of course, a user can ignore the key icon (as some ignore the lock-in and SSL/TLS popups).
http://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/06/16/dnssecchrome.html
DNSSEC is about end-to-end authenticity for DNS data, and one of those ends is the user application, so it's understandable that a burden of responsibility would shift towards it. TSIG is about transport security, it's not about data authenticity, I wouldn't describe it as an alternative - it is complementary to DNSSEC.
If DNSSEC succeeds, then doubtless there will be some successful in-application libraries and APIs for performing this - and those state machines won't be something we all have to worry about. But yes, it does shift the work-load.