So remind me of your original point? I believe you said it's "obviously wrong and laughable" that "an intelligent being can pursue stupid goals". Now here you are trying to convince me that humans are the ones who, like Pavlov's dogs, "pursue habits, processes, and heuristics that guide them through daily life even when those do not lead to any specific goal". Even when those habits involve repeatedly re-opening a fridge that you already know has no carrots in it, or salivating at a bell when you already know no food is coming.
So I'm confused how that proves your point about AGI. If I accept your view, it seems that if an AGI does merely no better than a human on this metric, I should anticipate all sorts of strange and irrational behaviour, including the pursuit of goals that would appear stupid, such as addiction to a reward channel. That does not seem to undermine the orthogonality thesis.
And the smarter the AGI gets, presumable the less it should lean on Pavlovian heuristics and the more it should make use of clear thought, which puts it more in my camp.
So that would apparently put the lower bound at "the AGI takes unexpected and irrational actions because it's not a rational agent and doesn't think coherently", and the upper bound at "the AGI takes unexpected and dangerous actions as rational steps toward an unaligned terminal goal".
I'm not sure where in this chain of thought it becomes laughably obvious that intelligence and goals are correlated, such that an AGI's increasing intelligence will tend it toward actions that we humans approve of, because anything else would be a "stupid goal"?
Think more carefully about the implications of multiple ways to survive here. Why do people pick one over the other? In a terminal/instrumental goal model, agents would pick the instrumental route that maximizes the return on the terminal goal. In reality we see that instead humans adopt habits, processes, and heuristics that guide them through daily life even when those do not lead to any specific goal.