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Re:Judge: Americans can be forced to decrypt their laptops by baddox on Tuesday January 24, 2012 @12:51AM (#3503656)
> I'm sure there's an even better way to accomplish something similar that I'm not thinking of

One example is what TrueCrypt calls plausible deniability. Your drive has an encrypted volume which initially appears to be completely random data (like all well-encrypted data). You have two decryption keys: an "innocent one" and the "real one." If asked or compelled to decrypt your drive, you decrypt it with the innocent one, and it becomes something innocent (like a bare operating system with no personal info). Obviously, the "real key" reveals your real operating system which you actually use, and thus contains personal information.

The kicker is, without the real key, not only can they not see your personal information, but it's physically impossible to even prove that there's another key which decrypts different data on the drive.

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=plausible-deniability

Re:Judge: Americans can be forced to decrypt their laptops by rorrr on Tuesday January 24, 2012 @01:09AM (#3503681)
TrueCrypt's deniability was broken in 2008. I'm not sure if they fixed it since then.
Re:Judge: Americans can be forced to decrypt their laptops by o2sd on Tuesday January 24, 2012 @02:05AM (#3503792)
>> TrueCrypt's deniability was broken in 2008.

Citation?

>> I'm not sure if they fixed it since then.

Maybe you could find out and post something useful.

Re:Judge: Americans can be forced to decrypt their laptops by asd344335345 on Tuesday January 24, 2012 @04:56AM (#3504126)
"In a paper published in 2008 and focused on the then latest version (v5.1a) and its plausible deniability, a team of security researchers led by Bruce Schneier states that Windows Vista, Microsoft Word, Google Desktop, and others store information on unencrypted disks, which might compromise TrueCrypt's plausible deniability. The study suggested the addition of a hidden operating system functionality; this feature was added in TrueCrypt 6.0. When a hidden operating system is running, TrueCrypt also makes local unencrypted filesystems and non-hidden TrueCrypt volumes read-only to prevent data leaks. The security of TrueCrypt's implementation of this feature was not evaluated because the first version of TrueCrypt with this option had only recently been released."
Re:Judge: Americans can be forced to decrypt their laptops by pyre on Tuesday January 24, 2012 @07:50AM (#3504475)
It clearly states that it did not evaluate the security plausible deniability of the 'hidden OS' feature.

This is basically saying that if you mount a hidden partition, you may leak information via things like browser cache that ends up getting saved to unencrypted areas. On the other hand, this says nothing about the case where you have the full drive encrypted and boot a different OS if you mount the hidden partition via the bootloader.