So the planning ends up being one of the more useful things to do because it prepares you for both your intentions but also to handle things when they fail (in some fashion). The plans, themselves, are useless because they will very rarely be carried through as written. You can't just read a plan and memorize it and expect to carry it out in an adversarial situation. If you're lucky, or your adversary is severely outmatched, then this can work. However, you can't count on luck and you can't count on your adversary being unprepared or incapable or incompetent.
Planning, contrasted to plans, prepares you (or should) for when the plans fail and you have to adapt and overcome in the field.
The enemy gets a vote
This generalizes beyond what's strictly though of as a "plan" (but if you squint enough may have some plan-like elements to it).
There are many forms of documents that we engineers produce and they serve different purposes at different times. And some of their uses may not be very effective in most cases, leading to wasting too much time in over-specifying a system that has not yet been built.
Yet, writing design documents / specs may be still useful despite the output not being useful. It's the act of writing it that yields most value.
I thought I added a nuance to what Eisenhower's said (or at least to how I noticed people interpret it) but apparently I did a poor job and adding more words would just make it worse.
An aphorism by definition doesn't contain all the nuances. If we looked through Eisenhower's whole life, which is pretty well documented, I'm sure we could find lengthy explanations of his approach to war.
What I try to add here is the fact that other forms of technical writing can be seen as forms of planning and thus there is a connection between the two aphorisms