Re:Password protect a static HTML page
by tptacek on Saturday February 18, 2023 @02:03PM
(#34849930)
If you call "encrypt" more than once in that code, you'll leak the authentication key. Every invocation of GCM encryption needs a unique nonce. Cryptography nerds will chastise you for using a random nonce (there theoretically isn't enough room in the GCM nonce space to safely encrypt large numbers of message with random nonces), but the alternative (using a counter) is even more hazardous. This problem motivates a lot of people to use other AEADs like XChapoly, which has an extended nonce space that safely admits random nonces. Isn't cryptography fun?
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Oh yes! Thank you for the feedback.
I've added a new version where the `iv` and the `salt` is random.
Maybe a followup question: Because you need both the `iv` and `salt` to decrypt the message is it ok in an E2E scenario to send all three: `iv`, `salt` and the encrypted message?
Re:Password protect a static HTML page
by tptacek on Saturday February 18, 2023 @03:09PM
(#34850546)
I didn't look to see what "salt" means in your design, but the idiom for using GCM in message encryption is to send ciphertexts that take the form `nonce || ciphertext`, and to decrypt by reading the nonce off the front of the message.
From what I shallowly researched; GCM's nonce seems limited to 12 bytes by convention only. That nonce reuse is so fatal seems absurd to me.
Would "salting" the key safely tackle the problem?
Put explicitly;
send <- nonce || salt || ciphertext
recv -> decrypt(ciphertext, nonce, pbkdf(pass) || salt)
[edit: apply salt outside of the kdf]
Re:Password protect a static HTML page
by tptacek on Saturday February 18, 2023 @03:58PM
(#34851021)
As I remember it, the balance of the bytes in the AES block are used for the counter. At any rate, the convention is essentially universal.
Sounds above my (current) head.
Here I thought GCM was some modern foolproof/footgunless design.
Re:Password protect a static HTML page
by tptacek on Saturday February 18, 2023 @04:34PM
(#34851334)
It is sort of infamously footgunny.
Re:Password protect a static HTML page
by ThePhysicist on Saturday February 18, 2023 @04:35PM
(#34851340)
It's still considered safe to call AES-GCM with a single key and a randomly generated nonce 2^32 times [1], most practical systems don't come anywhere near this limit. And there's AES-GCM-SIV that solves nonce reuse (mostly), though it's not available in the Web Cryptography API at the moment.
1: https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/crypto-publication...