> Perhaps we will never find out if language models have a theory of mind.
We appear to be in agreement here.
When the state of our knowledge is 'maybe', it seems rash to assume either 'yes' or 'no'.
What distinguishes two conjoined models from one model with a narrowing across the middle?
If the idea is to have two similar minds building a theory of each other, then I guess this could be informative, but first we'd have to establish that the models are "minds" in the first place. It's not clear to me what that requires.
One thing that has not been seen (as far as I know) is two or more of these animal subjects routinely having meaningful conversations among themselves. This would be a much richer source of data, and I do not think it would leave much doubt that they 'got' language to a very significant degree.
[1] https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2011/11/24/can-chimps-conve...
I think you are, because
> a model with greater capabilities than responding to prompts
interacts in other ways than text.
Even then, I don't see what's so special about language that it needs to be separated from other ways of interaction. If language is not enough to derive empirical answers, why should physical movements or radio emissions be?
Even if you don't assume that it's necessarily impossible to get the answers empirically for a text-based model, you must keep in mind that that option is open. Perhaps we will never find out if language models have a theory of mind.
However, judging by the discussions around the topic, very few people highligh the unknowability. If I have to choose between "yes" or "no" while the reality is "maybe", I'd choose a "yes" purely out of caution.