More modern languages like Go or Rust provides a lot of safety and is pretty easy to statically compile, so it's easily chrooted. It would however be weird to do a CGI program in Go, because that language already have a really good build in webserver and more powerful/easily accessible features for interacting with requests compared to what CGI provides.
Noting that not everyone has the ability to run standalone servers on their web hoster. Shared hosters generally enable CGIs but cannot support per-user standalone servers, in particular not on common ports like 80 or 443.
https://www.ionos.co.uk/digitalguide/server/configuration/ht...
You could write this off as a library implementation problem, but it comes about because of unfortunate mapping of HTTP parameters to well-known environment variables in CGI, and has tripped up multiple library authors.
* Code runs as web server user * Code is deployed as web server user, because web monkey doesn't understand unix permission (or alternatively chmod 777 everything for same effect) * Code gets hacked, attacker can modify any file so they just leave backdoor in code
If you deploy code as different user attacker can still of course steal all the data but at the very least they can't modify the code that is running.
On top of that, a lot of poor security practices when it comes to qouting stuff. Perl had kinda interesting feature regarding that where in special mode (recommended for apps dealing with untrusted inputs) the variable was considered tainted [1] till something "cleaned" it by passing it thru regexp. So say taking argument directly from environment (so headers for web) or stdin and passing it with no processing to system() would trigger it.