I mean, there's nothing wrong with Stratfor. It's just the business they're in means that the clients who engage them for one-off analysis jobs are often into some pretty... globally interesting things.

Think of it like this.

Say that, one day, all the pigs in town just disappear. Gone.

And everyone's like, "Hey. Where are all the pigs? This is crazy. Hey, Danilo, do you know where the pigs went?"

"Me? Uh, no."

But a few years later, the town librarian has all his emails leaked. And included among this is a brief exchange, a week before The Pig Event, wherein I ask "So, librarian, any advice on books for transporting livestock? Oh, could you set aside Pigs for Dummies for me?"

This message is now... pretty interesting.

Does it prove I'm a pig thief? Not necessarily, unless I get into more detail in other messages. It does suggest, though, that I might have known more than I did when the event happened. And that it's worth digging around for links between me and the pigs.

Stratfor was essentially labeled as a form of collateral damage. The self-described Anon spokesperson basically said they weren't one of the "offenders" but were "of interest".

I don't feel sold on the merits of going after Stratfor - it's almost as if it was merely a convenient and vulnerable target. It's not too hard to envision just about any company or organization being targeted because of some vague affiliation or "interest".

Stratfor is an organization (similar in a way to wikileaks) that offers private individuals the option of buying intelligence analysis. I used to be a subscriber.

How does stratfor get this intel to share with its clients? By tips provided by trusted sources in government. These people would probably lose their jobs if it was found out that they shared info with stratfor.

I would not be surprised if the USG infiltrated anonymous and did this attack as part of a campaign against whistleblowers.